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Summary 
 
The turbulent period of the last decade has highlighted the importance of the 
financial sector and the need for a flexible set of regulations and due diligence in 
order to have a healthy, sustainable and prosperous financial system. It has also 
given rise to important questions about the effect of current regulation and 
competition policies on the bank’s behaviour, economic growth and financial stability. 
This thesis has attempted to answer these questions, firstly, by analysing the effect 
of capital requirements on the UK banks’ choice for risk and capital and found 
evidence that they consider them as complements. This is making the policymaker’s 
decision more complicating as the end result of the bank’s stability cannot easily be 
determined because of that co-movement. 
Secondly, this thesis supports the existence of the bank capital channel for the case 
of the UK commercial banks. The focus is on the composition of their loan portfolio 
and capital growth following a change in capital requirements. I find evidence of 
structural change in the bank’s loan and capital management approach during and 
after the financial crisis, with the banks become significantly more responsive to 
capital requirements changes compared to the period before the crisis.  
Thirdly, the competition-fragility is documented for advanced Western economies 
when using concentration and market power as proxies for competition, while the 
competition-stability is present when using the Boone indicator which a measure of 
firm efficiency. Lastly, a strong regulatory framework becomes more beneficial for 
less competitive markets. 
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Chapter 1
Chapter 1 Introduction
The deregulation of the years before the credit crunch accompanied
by excessive lending due to ine¢ cient supervision have made possible the
unusual long lasting turbulent period that we are still trying to recover
from ten years later. The critical role of the banking industry in the
payments system as well as in facilitating credit for economic growth
justies the attention that regulation and supervision have attracted the
last decade. The recent nancial crisis has highlighted the importance of
systemic risk and the magnitude of the negative externalities that result
from bank failures which threaten the overall stability of the economy. It
has also made the regulators and the researchers to rethink and reform
the role of regulation and supervision, their tools and their impact on the
banks behaviour, nancial stability and economic growth. These impacts
are the focus of this thesis.
According to Ed Kane(1981) and Buser, Chen and Kane (1981), -
nance is dynamic and it is responding to and innovating around regula-
tion. This means that the supervisory and regulatory authorities need to
balance and adjust all three of their tasks; namely supervise the banks
risk management at the individual level, shield the competition condi-
tions in the industry and ensure nancial stability .This thesis examines
the impact of regulation and competition on the banks behaviour and -
nancial stability from the individuals, the industrys and the regulators
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prospective. Initially, I look at the change in risk behaviour of the rep-
resentative bank as a response to changes in capital requirements. Then
I study the e¤ect that the internal target capital ratio has on the as-
sets management approach of the commercial banks in the UK. Finally, I
analyse the inuence the competition in the banking industry has on the
overall nancial stability for Western advanced and developing economies.
Each chapter analyses how stability is inuenced from a di¤erent point of
view, rst from the representative banks, then from the banking indus-
trys and lastly from the regulators who observes average country level
data for the nancial system and the economy.
In Chapter 2 I built a theoretical framework to investigate how a
representative bank adjusts its risk and capital management strategies
in response to changes in minimum capital requirements. It explains
how the capital requirements a¤ect the banks decision about the risk
level of its portfolio and the capital level that it holds. This chapter
contributes to the literature as I identify two main indirect e¤ects coming
from the change in regulation on the banks behaviour. The rst one
is the protability e¤ect which comes through from the fact that higher
risk means higher return from the banks investment. Simultaneously,
the second e¤ect, the insurance e¤ect shows that the bank wants to be
insured against an increase in risk leading to a further increase in capital.
Using these e¤ects, the model identies two cases as to how the banks
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view capital and risk. For a su¢ ciently small risk level the insurance e¤ect
is lower than the protability e¤ect and riskiness and capital are viewed
as utility substitutes, while for a su¢ ciently large risk level the insurance
e¤ect dominates over the protability e¤ect and we have the complements
case. In the case of the complements, an increase in capital requirements
leads to an increase in both capital ratio and riskiness level while the end
result is ambiguous for the substitutes case. The model also o¤ers support
to the theory of capital bu¤ers for the UK, since the optimal solution for
capital is higher than the threshold set by the regulator. I incorporate that
into the model and with an increase in the minimum capital requirements
the capital ratio that the bank also increases. I attribute this to the notion
that for the bank it is costly to raise capital (especially in a short period
of time) after a change in the economic conditions or regulation and this
is modelled in my theoretical framework as a potential negative shock at
the end of the period that can reduce the value of the capital held by
the bank. Finally, following the calibration I show that the UK banks
consider capital and risk utility complements and a potential increase
of the capital requirements by the regulator will increase both of them
leading to partly policy backring as the overall increase or decrease of
the banks safeness is unclear. These results hold even after running
robustness tests to examine the sensitivity of the results to changes in the
parameters used in the calibration.
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In Chapter 3 I focus at the e¤ect of capital requirements on bank
lending and capital through the impact of the capital surplus/decit (Gap
index) that the banks hold compared to their internal target capital ratio.
Since this desired capital ratio is not directly observable, I estimate it
using variables known in the literature to a¤ect the banks capital. I
then use it to create the Gap index which shows the distance between
actual and target capital ratio. My dataset includes only commercial
banks (which are the most important ones for credit supply) in the UK
covering a period (1999-2016) of credit booming, the 2007-2009 nancial
crisis and the recovery period afterward, as well as various regulatory
frameworks (Basel I, Basel II and early stages of Basel III) .The majority
of the literature looked at a period that stops before the nancial crisis
or just covers the rst 2-3 years of it. Also, most studies only observe the
impact of the capital surplus/decit on the total loans and assets. This
chapter also contributes to the literature as I examine the e¤ect that the
Gap Index has on the di¤erent types of loans (i.e. commercial, consumer,
real estate, interbank and other loans).
The results show that an increase in capital requirements ( through the
decrease of the Gap index), increases the loans with the higher risk weight
following Basel II (i.e. commercial and consumer loans) and decreases the
ones which carry less weight (Real estate and interbank loans). Thus, fol-
lowing the Basel risk weights they adjust according to what is expected.
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However, the banks and the regulators do not include in their calculations
the underlying risk of the mortgage loans in a period of economic turbu-
lence which is translated to a decrease in the value of what was o¤ered
as a collateral for these loans. The possibility that these result might be
di¤erent during and after the crisis is examined. I nd that they intensify
their loan portfolio management during the crisis and their capital ratio
after the crisis. Moreover, Provisions for loan losses and Charge-o¤s act
as a deterrent for loans growth. The economic upturn proxied by the
GDP growth has a negative e¤ect on capital growth showing that when
the economy is in upturn banks take advantage of the high demand in
the economy and increase their risk weighted assets (RWA). Lastly, when
it is in downturn they shrink credit supply (I nd a positive relationship
between GDP growth and loans growth) and raise their capital which is
increasing their costs and limiting their revenue while they are su¤ering
losses from loan defaults which is not contributing to their survival.
In Chapter 4 I examine the competition-stability nexus using aggre-
gated data on the country level to focus on the overall (rather than the in-
dividual bank risk which is usually investigated) of the industry. Lastly, I
test the impact of regulation on the competition stability relationship and
its linearity. This chapter also contributes to the literature as it studies
the EU countries, something that very few studies have done in the past.
Specically, my sample includes the 28 countries of the European Union
5
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and four other Western advanced economies (i.e. USA, Canada, Switzer-
land and Norway). I use two di¤erent competition measures (Lerner,
Boone) and one concentration (HHI) for a period (2002-2011) that in-
cludes the recent nancial crisis. The Lerner and the HHI index support
the competition-fragility approach, namely higher market power or con-
centration lead to greater stability when controlling for macroeconomic,
Banking sector-specic and regulatory variables. On the contrary, the
Boone indicator supports the theory of competition-stability implying
that the benets of the competition outweighed its shortcomings. I also
examine the sensitivity of the results on the regulatory framework in the
country and the assumption of linear specication. I nd evidence that
the benet in stability from higher supervisory power and more stringent
activity restrictions is greater in a less competitive banking industry, but
no evidence is present of a U-shaped relationship between competition
and stability.
In Chapter 5 I summarise the ndings of this thesis and I discuss the
policy implications and future research. The banks in the UK consider
risk and capital as complements, thus changing both of them in the same
direction. This is complicating the decision of the policymaker for change
in capital requirements as the level of stability for the bank after its re-
action is not easily determined. The UK commercial banks are simply
following the regulators guidance for risk, using mainly the risk weighted
6
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assets, to set their portfolio strategy instead of taking into considerations
all risks involved in their decisions. The increased market power and con-
centration, following the mergers and acquisitions after the crisis, do not
seem to have helped the nancial stability of the EU and other West-
ern advanced economies. On the contrary, the level of competition as
measured by the Boone estimator has increased nancial stability.
7
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Are capital requirements making Banks riskier?
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Abstract
The 2007-2009 nancial crisis has brought an increase in interest from researchers
about the stringent of the banking regulation and capital requiremetns. In this
chapter I examine the e¤ect that an increase in capital requirements would have on
the banks choice of risk and capital level using a static model with a representative
bank. The results from the theoretical section show that the banks optimal choice
of capital ratio and risk are ambigious depending on whether the bank considers
capital and risk as expected utility substitutes or complements. The calibration
for the UK that follows favours the complements case, resulting in an increase in
both capital and risk after an increase in capital requirements. This leads to the
policy partially backring as it fails to restrict risk.
JEL Codes:G21, G28, G33, G38
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1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has highlighted the critical role that the banking indus-
try plays in facilitating credit for economic growth and how important nancial
stability is for the economy. The deregulation of the years before the credit crunch,
combined with excessive lending and unanticipated shocks to borrowerscreditwor-
thiness have led the banking system into a turbulent period that we are still trying
to recover from ten years later. This has underlined the importance of an e¤ective
set of regulations and due diligence in order to have a healthy, sustainable and
prosperous banking industry.
The regulator, in order to achieve these goals, has at his disposal a number of
tools and instruments. These include capital requirements, designed to force banks
to limit the distress of individual banks by adjusting their risk-taking behaviour
or the capital quantity or a combination of both to meet the required target. The
increase of the capital ratio should secure the banks further against an unexpected
troubled period and the more risk averse behaviour will limit further the proba-
bility of a nancial crisis. The implication is that policymakers, in their design
of capital regulation and supervision level, face a trade o¤ between the potential
positive e¤ects the capital requirements have on nancial stability and negative
on economic growth. They need to balance the benets with the costs of these de-
cisions in order to maximise the social welfare. Undertaking this type of analysis,
however, is di¢ cult without an understanding of how capital requirements a¤ect
bank risk taking behaviour and capital management.
The Basel Comittees answer to the recent nancial crisis has been even more
10
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complexity for the bank regulation and supervision, risk management at the in-
dividual bank level and use of harmonised policies for di¤erent institutional envi-
ronments. This approach combined with the fact that the regulators allowed the
accumulation of such high levels of risk in the banking systems around the world,
has led to the question how do capital requirements inuence the banks choice of
capital ratio and risk.
A large number of empirical papers show the e¤ects of capital requirements on
banks choices. One of the main arguments in favour of raising minimum capital
requirements is that it forces shareholders to keep more skin in the game, thus
reduces the incentives to engage in risk shifting (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2010).
Akinsoyinu (2015) investigates the impact of capital regulation on the capital
behaviour of European large and complex banks during the period 2009 2014
and nds that regulation has a positive and signicant impact on changes in bank
capital. Similar results can be found in Alfon et al. (2004) and Francis and Osborne
(2010) when using banks internal target capital ratios in their models. According
to Heid et al. (2004) the coordination of capital and risk adjustments depends on
the amount of capital the bank holds in excess of the regulatory minimum (capital
bu¤er). They show that banks with high capital bu¤ers try to maintain them
by raising capital and risk simultaneously in response to an increase in capital
requirements. In other words, even if the banks meet the capital requirements
after the increase they will still decide to increase their capital ratio in response
to the stricter regulatory environment.
The capital bu¤er theory implies that the capital requirements are binding on
bank behaviour. In order to test for those co-movements between capital ratios and
11
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capital ratio requirements over time, Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2012) sort
banks into four groups based on the bu¤er over minimum capital requirements that
they were holding. They show that for all four categories of banks, the variation
in minimum capital requirements was positively correlated with substantial co-
movement between actual capital ratios and minimum requirements. These results
are in line with the ones other researchers have found for the UK banks (Alfon et
al (2005), Francis and Osborne (2009,2010), and Bridges et al. (2014)).
I construct a theoretical framework to investigate how a representative bank
responds to changes in the regulatory environment, and specically how the capital
requirements a¤ect the banks decision about the risk level of its portfolio and the
capital that it holds. As mentioned above and supported by de-Ramon et al.
(2016), banks act to maintain bu¤ers above the regulatory thresholds even when
regulatory capital requirements are not binding. To incorporate that into the
model and explain the motivation that the banks have to hold capital bu¤ers, I
include a shock that can alter the value of the capital held by the bank at the end
of the period. This shock shows the uncertainty that the bank is facing about the
performance of the portfolio and subsequently its utility. The bank is uncertain
whether it will meet the capital requirements ex post, and so chooses to hold a
bu¤er to insure against the cost of having to rapidly top up its capital. This
analysis is in line with the capital bu¤er theory, since, as a reaction to an increase
in capital requirements a well capitalised bank is expected to increase both the
capital ratio and the level of risk while an undercapitalised bank might end up
with an optimal combination which has either more or less capital and risk than
it had originally (Heid et al. (2004)).
12
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I need to underline at this point the importance of making risk a choice variable
for the bank. This Basel approach has been a key contribution to nancial crises
since the late 1990s. Although the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision(BCBS)
treats risk as an exogenous characteristic of assets, in fact it is endogenous. Persaud
(2000) and Danielsson et al. (2001) made this point early when Basel II was
still under discussion, but the BCBS has not addressed the point. Whether it
is requiring banks to have the same risk weights (Basel I) or to use the same or
similar models (Basel II and III), the Committees assumption is that risk is an
exogenous property of various assets and that it can be estimated. However, the
act of encouraging all banks to look at risk the same way and to reward them
when they increase the proportion of low riskassets in their portfolio increases
the fragility of the banking sector. Danielsson et al (2001) argue that ignoring the
endogeneity of risk is innocuous in normal times but deadly in a crisis, because
it encourages a simultaneous run for the exit, that is a simultaneous dumping of
assets and drying up of markets for these assets as only sellers are to be found.
The paper most closely related to my chapter is Agur and Demertzis(2015)
which is also taking into account the regulators trade-o¤ discussed above . In
Agurs (2015) model the focus is mainly on the e¤ect that the monetary policy
has on bank risk and bank capital level. They have a probability of survival for
the bank and they use the leverage cap as the regulators instrument. The rate
of return for their investment is exogenous and they do not consider a case in
which the state of the world can change and the implications that this may have.
Their results depend on whether regulatory capital requirements are binding or
not. There are signicant di¤erences between my approach and the one that Agur
13
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and Demertzis(2015) follow in terms of model specication and focus of research.
My focus of research is not the e¤ect of the monetary policy but the impact of
changes in capital requirements have on the representative banks risk and capital
ratio. The rate of return in this model is not exogenous but it is dependent upon
the level of risk that the bank chooses. Also, the return on capital is not xed or
known to the bank and the regulator at the beginning of the period and it can
be either positive or negative, as it is a shock which follows after a change in the
state of the world, and the bank can only form an expectation for it. Finally, I
do not come up with two di¤erent results for when the capital requirements are
binding and when they are not. In this model, the bank has to pay a penalty if
at the of the period it does not meet the capital requirements which it takes into
consideration when choosin its level of risk and capital at the beginning of the
period.
According to Bliss and Kaufman (2002) the regulatory tightening of capital ra-
tios can produce analogous aggregate shocks and, therefore, that prudential capital
requirements can inuence macro-economic outcomes. Keeping that in mind the
regulator faces a trade o¤. He needs to consider the e¤ects of more stringent
capital policies on bank investments and consequently on economic growth and
nancial stability. In this model, the bank chooses the level of riskiness for its
portfolio and the capital that it will hold to maximise its expected utility that it
gains from the prot function. The capital requirements are exogeneously set and
at the end of the period a shock is realised and the value of the capital that the
bank holds is updated. This way, depending on the combination of its protability
and its capital value, the bank may end up in di¤erent cases. It can either meet
14
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the capital requirements and have prots or loses or it will pay the penalty for not
meeting the capital requirements and again end up with prots or losses.
I identify two main e¤ects coming from the banks maximisation problem. The
rst one is the insurance e¤ect. After an increase in risk, the bank wants to be
insured against it which leads to an increase in capital. At the same time we have
the protability e¤ect which comes through from the fact that higher risk means
higher return from the banks investment. This causes the bank to reduce capital in
order to expand its investments. The main result of the theoretical model is that it
identies two seperate cases as to how the banks view risk and capital, whether they
consider them substitutes or complements. The relationship between the banks
capital ratio and its choice of riskiness after an increase in capital requirements
depends on whether the protability e¤ect or the insurance e¤ect dominates. More
specically, for a su¢ ciently small risk level the insurance e¤ect is lower than
the protability e¤ect and riskiness and capital are utility substitutes, while for a
su¢ ciently large risk level the insurance e¤ect is higher than the protability e¤ect
and riskiness and capital are utility complements. In the case of complements, an
increase in capital requirements leads to an increase in both capital ratio and
riskiness level which suggests the policy backring. The regulator should not
make the bank more risky by increasing the capital requirements, especially if
it is not accompanied by an increase on its capital ratio. However, in the case
of substitutes an increase in capital requirements the result is ambiguous and it
becomes an empirical question to determine which case the bank will end up with,
given the specic values of the di¤erent parameters of the model. I examine this
in Section four for the case of the UK.
15
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The baseline model following the calibration for the UK banks shows that the
banks consider capital and risks utility complements and a potential increase of
the capital requirements by the regulator will bring an increase of both capital and
risk: This is suggesting that the policy is partly backring as ideally this should
lead to increase in capital and decrease in risk. According to the data and the
results I nd that, as predicted by the literature, the banks hold capital bu¤ers
to insure against potential negative shocks in the economy and to avoid having to
bare the cost of rapidly increasing their capital in case of an increase in capital
requirements. I run robustness tests to examine if the results are sensitive to
changes in the parameters of the calibration and the outcome is that very small
uctuations are observed which do not alter the intuition of the results.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The model and the banks
maximisation problem is explained in detail in Section two. The implications
coming from the outcomes of the model are discussed in Section three. The results
from the calibration are analysed in Section four. Section ve concludes.
16
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2 The Banks maximisation problem
In this economy we have one player who is a representative bank and the capital
requirements are set exogenously by a regulator. The regulator chooses the capital
requirements level (k) at the beginning of the period such that both economic sta-
bility and growth are ensured. The bank has initially a wealth which is normalised
to be equal to 1, which could represent the value of its deposits. It can choose
at the beginning of the period to either invest or hold as capital (k), so implicitly
by choosing the amount of capital that it will hold it also decides how much to
invest. In this static model at the end of the period, if there is a shock in the
economy, the value of the capital that the bank actually holds changes according
to K = k(1 + ) where  represents the shock and it follows an unknown distribu-
tion   F (); where  2 [ 1;+1]. What has been described as a shock in this
model can also be considered as the stochastic rate of return for the capital.
The amount of the investment that the bank can choose can be represented
by any portfolio that contains risky assets that the bank can get a return from.
That risky asset can be loans and the underlying net rate of return of the amount
invested in loans follows an unknown distribution and it is denoted by r  G(r),
where r 2 [ 1;+1]. The level of risk(x) that its investment will be exposed to
is the second choice variable that the bank has. The rate of return on investment
is described as rx. Clearly, E(rx) = xE(r) & V ar(rx) = x2V ar(r). So for x > 1,
investment becomes more risky,but more protable on average. The bank makes
the decision for k and x based on the capital requirements (k) set by the regulator
and the belief it has about the . The prot function1 for the bank is:
1The case of the limited liability was also explored, however, because it introduced too many
17
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 (k; x) =
8><>: (1 + rx)(1  k) + k(1 + )  1, if k(1 + )  k(1 + rx)(1  k) + k(1 + )  1  [k   k(1 + )] , if k(1 + ) < k
9>=>;
(1)
In the prot function the (1 + rx)(1 k) shows the gross return on investment,
the k(1 + ) shows the return on capital, 1 is the initial wealth. The last term,
[k   k(1 + )] ; is the amount by which the bank needs to top up its capital at
the end of the period if it does not meet the regulators standards, which can be
considered as a sanction. The price of the capital is normalised to 1. The bank
can end up in di¤erent states at the end of the period depending on whether it has
prot or losses and on whether the actual capital that it holds at the end of the
period (K) meets the regulators capital requirements or not. If the rate of return
for the risky asset is not su¢ ciently large to compensate for the actual amount held
as capital after a potential negative shock has been realised, then the bank will
not have a positive prot. If at the end of the period the bank satises the capital
requirements, i.e., k(1 + )  k, then no action is taken. If the capital at the end
of the period is such that k(1 + ) < k, then the bank is forced to restore capital
by replenishing the shortfall C = k   k(1 + ) in order to satisfy the regulatory
capital requirements which is assumed that it nances instantly by borrowing any
amount necessary from the nancial market. The price at which it purchases the
new equity is normalised to one. This policy implements a contingent enforcement
of a capital requirement. The condition that shows this case is:
channels it was far from trivial to pinpoint and justify a sign for the second order conditions.
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k(1 + ) < k ,  < k
k
  1 (2)
According to the literature(e.g. Furne (2000)), banks choose to hold excess
capital to avoid costs related to market discipline and supervisory intervention if
approaching or falling below the regulatory minimum capital-ratio. That happens
because a poorly capitalised bank risks losing market condence and reputation, so
capital bu¤ers act as an insurance against costs that may occur due to unexpected
loan losses and di¢ culties in raising new capital. This means that even if the
capital that the bank chooses at the beginning of the period is equal to k, meeting
the regulators requirements, it needs to hold su¢ ciently more than required capital
to mitigate the loss of its capital value after a negative shock  is realised. In this
model the bank is allowed to su¤er losses, as opposed to the case of the limited
liability in which their losses are bounded to be non-negative by denition. I
assume that the banks utility function is U(jk; x) and that it satises U 0() > 0
and U 00() < 0 to show that the bank is risk averse. So combining the above with
the conditions the banks expected utility is as follows:
E[U(jk; x)] =
Z 1
= k
k
 1
Z 1
r= 1
U [(k; x)]g(r)f()drd (3)
+
Z k
k
 1
= 1
Z 1
r= 1
U [(k; x)  C(k; k; )]g(r)f()drd
The rst term shows the expected utility for the bank conditional on the bank
meeting the regulators demands at the end of the period, i.e.   k
k
 1. In this case
the bank holds su¢ cient capital at the end of the period according to the regulators
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standards and C(k; k; ) = 0. The second term shows the banks expected utility
conditional on the bank having a prot but not meeting the regulators demands
at the end of the period, i.e.  < k
k
  1. In this case the bank needs to top up its
capital ratio following the regulators specications which means that C(k; k; ) > 0
causing the bank to decrease its prots or increase its losses. Based on its expected
prot function the bank chooses capital and the level of riskiness of its portfolio
to maximize it as follows:
max
k;x
fE[U(jk; x)]g (4)
This leads to a set of rst order conditions. k is chosen to satisfy:
Z 1
= k
k
 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 0[(k; x)]g(r)f()drd (5)
+
Z k
k
 1
= 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 0[(k; x)  C(k; k; )](2+ 1)g(r)f()drd
=
Z 1
= k
k
 1
Z +1
r= 1
[U 0((k; x))rx] g(r)f()drd
+
Z k
k
 1
= 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 0[(k; x)  C(k; k; )]rxg(r)f()drd
From (5) we can see that the LHS represents the marginal benet from an
increase in capital since by doing so,because of the limits on the interval, the bank
is shifting probability from ending up in the sanction scenario(second term in LHS)
toward the prots case(rst term in LHS). Since  is the the return on capital, by
increasing capital this is what the bank gains by doing so. The RHS represents
the marginal cost of increasing capital since intuitively more capital held means
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less investment, so since rx is the payo¤ from investing, this is what that bank is
losing. This in turn, would lead to lower prot and lower utility. So x is chosen to
satisfy:
Z 1
= k
k
 1
Z 1
r=0
[U 0((k; x))r] g(r)f()drd (6)
+
Z k
k
 1
= 1
Z 1
r=0
[U 0((k; x)  C(k; k; ))r] g(r)f()drd
=  
Z 1
= k
k
 1
Z 0
r= 1
U 0[(k; x)]rg(r)f()drd
 
Z k
k
 1
= 1
Z 0
r= 1
[U 0((k; x)  C(k; k; )]r] g(r)f()drd
The level of risk (x) a¤ects both the expected value and the variance of the
rate of return on loans (r). Given that the good state of the economy is when
r  0; for x > 1, we have that the LHS represents the marginal benet from an
increase in x, because of its E(r), the bank enjoys higher prots and higher utility.
On the other hand, when r  0; for x > 1, we are at the bad state of the economy
and by increasing x, the bank is more likely that it will su¤er losses and lower
utility, which is the marginal cost from increasing risk and it is represented by the
RHS. Because of the banks risk aversion, an increase in x in the bad state of the
world will bring a more sizeable decrease in utility for the bank than the increase
in utility that it would bring in the good state of the world. This is used as a
deterrent so that the risk averse bank holds su¢ cient capital and not excessively
increase risk in its portfolio. The conditions for interior maximum are presented
in appendix A.
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3 Policy implications
It is well established in the literature that when the capital requirements are in-
creased then the banks react by increasing their capital ratio either to maintain
their capital bu¤er or to build an adequate one to avoid market discipline. Addi-
tionally, Furne (2001) shows that there is a positive relationship between regula-
tory scrutiny of banks and their capital ratios. Theoretically, it has been shown,
that although capital adequacy regulation may reduce the total volume of risky
assets, the composition may be distorted in the direction of more risky assets. The
result may well be an increase in average risk which is referred to in the literature
as the moral hazard e¤ect. The empirical literature that has tested this prediction
is building on a model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992). Following the cap-
ital bu¤er theory, Heid et al. (2004) show that banks with high capital bu¤ers try
to maintain their capital bu¤er by raising capital and risk simultaneously. Also
Harris et al. (2014) in a general equilibrium setup suggest that, under competition,
increases in capital requirements cause more banks to engage in "value-destroying
risk-shifting". In this sense, a policy aiming to reduce banks exposure to risk by
increasing capital requirements may backre.
3.1 Policy possibly backring?
Using the FOC and SOC of the banks maximisation problem I construct gure 1
and gure 2 to show the relationship between the change in capital requirements
and the optimal choice that the bank makes for its risk and capital. The line
labeled as k* represents the the banks optimal choice of capital for every given
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level of risk (i.e. the solution to FOC for each given x) and, similarly, the line
labeled as x* represents the banks optimal choice of risk for every given level of
capital.
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I nd the banks optimal combination of its choice variables, where these two
lines meet, as both FOC are satised simultaneously. The e¤ect of an increase in
risk on the marginal utility of capital can be either positive or negative, making
k and x either substitutes or complements. The EUkx determines the slope of the
x* and k* lines since EUkk < 0 and EUxx < 0(Appendix A) in order to have a
maximum:
@k*
@x
=  EUkx
EUkk
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and
@x*
@k
=  EUkx
EUxx
The EUkx is shown below:
@2E(U(jk; x))
@k@x
=
Z 1
= k
k
 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 00[(k; x)]r(  rx)g(r)f()drd (7)
+
Z k
k
 1
= 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 00[(k; x)  C(k; k; )]r(2+ 1  rx)g(r)f()drd
The rst term shows the case when the bank meets the capital requirements
and the second one when it does not. Also, (2 + 1   rx) > (   rx) ,  >  1
and following from the SOC I would expect that on average (  rx) < 0 in order
for the problem to have an intuitive meaning. Specically, in the case that the
bank has prots the return from the investment(risky asset) should be greater
than the one from the capital (safer asset). We also need (2+ 1  rx) > 0, since
in the penalty case the payo¤ from capital needs to be greater than the one from
investment to motivate the bank to hold some capital, otherwise the bank would
hold no capital and accept to pay the penalty since it would be covered by the
return of the risky asset. For a large capital ratio (k), because of the limits on the
intervals, the rst term of this SOC dominates the second one and it is making
the whole SOC negative and similarly for small values of k it becomes positive.
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Intuitively, I identify two opposing endogenous indirect e¤ects coming through
from the increase in x. The rst one is the insurance e¤ect which makes the bank
want to be insured against it and for that reason it increases capital and decreases
its investment. The other one is the protability e¤ect which comes through from
the fact that higher risk means higher return from the banks investment which
leads to as increase in investment and decrease in capital to exploit the risky
assets higher protability which leads to higher utility. When the insurance e¤ect
dominates the protability e¤ect then on average EUkx < 0 and if the protability
e¤ect is the dominant one the EUkx > 0.
The higher the initial risk before the increase, the bigger the insurance e¤ect
and the smaller the protability e¤ect becomes. This is because, the risk averse
bank will not consider the additional return coming from the increased risk enough
not compensate for the larger probability for losses. In other words, if the bank
operates under a su¢ ciently large risk level then the e¤ect of an increase in risk
on the marginal utility of capital is, on average, positive since the insurance e¤ect
will be higher than the protability e¤ect. This means that we can characterise
the riskiness and the capital as utility complements. If the bank has chosen a
su¢ ciently small risk level then the e¤ect of an increase in risk on the marginal
utility of capital is, on average, negative since the insurance e¤ect is lower than the
protability e¤ect and this means that riskiness and capital are utility substitutes.
To analyse the expected result of the optimal choices combination I intuitively
consider that @
2E(U(jk;x))
@k@k
> 0 and @
2E(U(jk;x))
@x@k
> 0 (see appendix B). Furthermore,
following the evidence from the literature explained above, I need to assume that
@k*
@k
> 0 and @x*
@k
> 0: Using these assumptions I can go through the two cases
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by examining the e¤ects of an increase in capital requirements and the results are
shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
In the case that riskiness and capital are utility complements, after an increase
in capital requirements the bank will respond by increasing its capital ratio to
maintain its capital bu¤er, which is the direct e¤ect from the increase in k. This
will in turn allow the bank to tolerate higher levels of risk, but because in this
case, the bank prefers to be overinsured than to enjoy higher returns from the
increased level of x, the bank will further increase its capital in order to insure
against that extra level of risk. In other words we have that the insurance e¤ect
is stronger than the protability e¤ect for that bank, which are the indirect e¤ects
of a change in k. This leads to the banks optimal combination consisting of more
capital and a higher riskiness level which suggests that the policy is backring,
since the regulator by increasing capital requirements should be aiming for an
increased capital ratio and a decreased level of risk. As we can see in Figure 1,
if the utility maximising combination of optimal x* and k* is at point A then an
increase in k will initially bring an increase in k, This will continue until the banks
optimal choices point gradually moves from point A to point B after the increase
in capital requirements.
For the substitutes case, in Figure 2, because both x* and k* lines are downward
sloping and the result of an increase in capital requirements is ambiguous since it
depends on the magnitude of the response of the x* and k* lines to that change.
After an increase in capital requirements, since k and x are utility substitutes, the
two e¤ects might partially o¤set each other leading to an ambiguous outcome. To
see this we need to perform a similar analysis as before,namely an increase in k
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will bring an increase in k,which is the direct e¤ect, and this will in turn allow
higher levels of risk. This time, the bank prefers to aim for higher returns from the
increased level of x and enjoy the additional prot than to be overinsured against
it. This is interpreted as dominance of the protability e¤ect over the insurance
e¤ect, which are the indirect e¤ects of a change in k. In Figure 2 this is translated
as a move from the initial point A to any point similar to point B(more k and
less x) or to any point similar to point C(less k and more x) or any point between
them.
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4 Quantitative Analysis
Since the theoretical model provided two possible cases for the bank to consider
the risk and capital as substitutes or complements it motivates me to perform a
quantitative analysis to nd clear results. In this section I illustrate the results
of the calibration and simulation of the model. In the calibration subsection, I
describe a set of benchmark parameters calibrated using U.K. banking data and
the exogenously dened parameters. Following that, I analyse the e¤ects of the
changes in capital requirements on the banks choice variables (i.e. x and k).
4.1 Functional forms
In order to show the banks risk aversion I use the following CARA2 utility function
:
U(k; x) = 1  e c(k;x)
where c is the absolute risk aversion coe¢ cient and (k; x) is the prot function
as described in (1). In the theoretical model the bank chooses between a risky asset
(loans) and a safer asset (capital) and the rate of return of the loans is (1 + rx)
and the rate of return of the capital is (1 + ). I assume that both  and r are
normally distributed , so we have that r  N(r; r) and   N(; ):
2The alternative would be to use a CRRA utility function. However, because it shows the
relative risk aversion, the ratio produced using the values for my model did not o¤er enough
variation to return a single internal solution. The best response lines (x and k) were shown to
be identical after a point, giving innite solutions.
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4.2 Algorithm
In the algorithm, I setup the grid for  and r which are set at three standard
deviations on either side of its mean capturing the 99.8% of the normal distribution.
As the mean of r changes the rs grid is shifting accordingly. Given , r, k, x I
calculate the prot function under the condition that for certain values for k and 
there can be two scenarios, one where the bank is meeting the capital requirements
at the end of the period and the other one where it does not and it needs to pay
the cost of toping up its capital ratio. Based on these two cases I calculate the
banks prot which in turn is used to provide the utility matrix for the bank. Each
k and x will provide the the corresponding expected utility (E[U(jk; x)) over the
distribution of  and r. For each x I nd the corresponding k* and similarly for
each k I nd the corresponding x* which give me the k* and x* lines which I use
to nd the optimal level of capital and risk.
4.3 Calibration
The model is calibrated for the U.K., from data collected from Bloomberg and
the S&P Capital IQ platform, using data for the U.K. banks from the period
1997-2016 and from a database used in de-Ramon et al.(2016) to account for a
business cycle. There is a set of exogenously determined parameters and another
one which results from a grid search by matching empirical moments. Starting
with the rst set of exogenous parameters, for the  I proxy  and  by the
net interest rate income part of the Return on Equity (ROE), which results in
 = 0:05 and  = 0:085. I use the same period and banks to get the average
30
4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS Chapter 2
Total Risk Based Capital Ratio (k), which I nd to be 14%. Furthermore, using
the same dataset,I proxy the probability of the rate of return for the loan to be less
than 1 by using the average percentage of loan loss provisions, which is equal to
1%. The last parameter needed is taken from previous research. More specically,
the individual capital requirements (k) is set to 11.1% and it is taken from de-
Ramon et al. (2016) who are using semi-annual data for the period 1989 to 2013
for banks from the U.K..
The second set of parameters consists of r, r and c: To nd the values
I perform a grid search to match three empirical moments by minimising their
Euclidean distance. The moments are the Total Risk Based Capital Ratio (k),
the probability of the rate of return for the loan to be less than 1 (Pr obFail in
the algorithm which is equal to 0.01) and the rate of return on loans. The data
for all three moments are taken from the database constructed for the U.K. banks
from the period 1997-2016. The rate of return on loans that is observed cannot
be used directly to calibrate the rate of return on the investment, since in this
model, the yield of the investment is not just r but rx and x is endogenously
determined. The resulting values of this set of parameters are r = 0:5% and
r = 0:2% and c = 189:7. The absolute risk aversion coe¢ cient(c) is a larger
than expected number as I have restricted k to be between [0,1] in order to read
the results in percentages and it is a matter of rescaling it to replicate the value
expected(usually between 1 and 10). In Table 1 below there are the simulated and
empirical moments and their distance. The overall distance has been minimised
and it is only 0.0118. In Table 2 there is a summary of the parameters used for
the calibration of the baseline model.
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Parameters Capital ProbFail r
Simulated 0.1418 0 0.053
Empirical 0.14 0.01 0.053
Distance 0.0018 0.01 0
0.0102Overall distance
Table 1: Empirical Moments matched
Table 1 shows the Euclidean distance between
the simulated and the empirical values of the
moments that I match in order to perform a
grid search for the mean and standard
deviation of the risky asset's rate of return and
the absolute risk aversion coefficient. The data
used for all three moments are taken from the
database constructed for the U.K. banks for
the period 1997-2016.
In Table 3 I illustrate the results from the robustness tests to show the sen-
sitivity of the results to changes in the parameters of the calibration. It appears
that the optimal k remains the same with all the changes of the parameters and
this can be explained by two things. Firstly, the capital is actually uctuating but
by a very small amount and the three decimal points do not allow us to see it.
Secondly, as seen in Figure 3, this level of capital seems to be enough for the bank
to make sure that it avoids to pay the cost of rapidly raising capital since at the
end of the period it will be k(1 + )  k. The optimal x uctuates as expected
since an increase r or r will bring a decrease in the additional risk that the
bank needs to take(x) maximise its expected utility and similar logic applies for
a decrease in r or r: Moreover, the increase in c brings an expected matching
decrease in the x* as the more risk averse bank will choose a lower optimal level of
risk. The changes in x* do not alter the underlying intuition of the results which
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Parameters Values
με 5%
σε 8.5%
μr 0.5%
σr 0.2%
k 11.1%
c 189.7
Table 2: Baseline model parameters
Table 2 summarises the values of the
parameters used for the calibration of the
baseline model.  The data are taken from
the database constructed for the U.K.
banks for the period 1997-2016.
suggests that they are robust.
4.4 Capital Requirements
Here I examine the impact of the capital requirements on the banks optimal choice
of risk (x*) and capital (k*). Table 4 below shows the e¤ects of a 5% increase and
decrease of k ceteris paribus. In the rst case, when k goes up by 5% (from 11.1%
to 11.65%), we see that k* goes up from 13.5% to 14.5% (7.4% increase) and x*
goes up from 10.6 to 10.7 (0.94% increase). In the other case, when k goes down by
5% (from 11.1% to 10.55%), we see that k* goes down from 13.5% to 13% (3.7%
decrease) and x* goes down from 10.6 to 10.55 (0.47% decrease). We see that
k is more sensitive to changes of k than x is. This outcome conrms the initial
assumption that @k
@k
> 0 and it also shows that @x
@k
> 0: As explained in the theory
section, when x and k are utility complements, an increase (decrease) in k will bring
an increase (decrease) in both x* and k*. The protability e¤ect is dominated by
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Parameters x* k*
Baseline 10.60 13.50%
1.01*μr 10.50 13.51%
0.99*μr 10.70 13.49%
1.01*σr 10.20 13.52%
0.99*σr 11.00 13.49%
1.01*c 10.50 13.51%
0.99*c 10.70 13.49%
Table 3:Robusteness tests
Table 3 illustrates the robustness test
reults, showing the sensitivity of the results
to changes in the parameters used for the
calibration of the baseline model.
Parameters Baseline 1.05*k 0.95*k
x* 10.6 10.7 10.55
k* 13.5% 14.5% 13%
Table 4 shows the effect that a 5% increase and decrease of the level of
capital k has on the optimal level of risk (x*) and the optimal level of
capital (k*) that the bank would choose, ceteris paribus.
Table 4: Effect of capital requirements change
the insurance e¤ect leading the bank to choose a more than proportional increase
in k than x when the capital requirements are increased: Also, because of its risk
averse nature, the bank chooses to have a smaller reaction to the decrease of k
than to its increase.
In Figure 3 the x* and k* lines are plotted from the calibrated baseline model
and where they meet we have the banks solution to its maximisation problem and
according to the graph it is a unique solution. As they are both upward sloping
they represent the complements case. For values of x below 10 the corresponding
values of k are negative and as it approaches +1 the corresponding k values
asymptotically approach 1. The k* line appears to be very steep for values of
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x below 100 and the corresponding k is around 13.5% which is the optimal k*.
This level of k* is the one that makes sure that the bank does not pay the cost of
purchasing the additional capital needed to meet the capital requirements at the
end of period and low levels of x (below 10) cannot secure a high enough return
from the investment to cover that cost.
Figure 3: Best response lines for risk and capital
The x* line is the bank's best response for the different levels of capital deriving from the
calibrated baseline model. Similarly, the k* line is the bank's best response for the different
levels of risk of its portflolio. At the point where they cross we find the optimal level of risk
and capital for the bank given the values of the parameters for this model.
Two more things to note about Figure 3 are that the two lines do not cross
or converge as x is going to values higher than 250, which means that the two
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lines only meet at the point shown in the graph giving a unique solution to the
banks expected utility maximisation problem. The second point to discuss is the
substitution area which is not shown in this graph. The reason for that is that
it exists for very small values of x which cannot be specied in this graph. This
is because the model is calibrated for the U.K. and in this case the optimal x* is
always haigher than these values. So the regulator only observes the complements
scenario and sets the capital requirements accordingly and based on that the banks
derive their optimal solutions for capital ratio and risk. These results are in line
with the notion (Heid et al. (2004)) that better capitalised banks (U.K. banks)
tend to maintain their capital bu¤er after an increase in capital requirements by
increasing both capital and the risky assets.
36
5. CONCLUSION Chapter 2
5 Conclusion
In this chapter I develop a static model of a bank in an economy where the reg-
ulator determines the level of the capital requirements and the uncertainty about
the economic conditions can inuence the value of the capital that the bank holds
at the end of the period leading to the cost of recapitalising. The model is cali-
brated using data for the U.K. commercial banks to explain how do banks react to
changes of capital requirements when they can adjust their level of risk and capital.
The theoretical model provides an ambiguous answer, while the calibrated version
clearly points to one of the cases.
The main result is that the banks consider the capital and the risk as utility
complements and a potential increase of the capital requirements by the regulator
will bring an increase of both capital and risk which is suggesting that the policy
is backring. Also, there are two indirect e¤ects which are working in opposite
directions resulting from the banks maximisation problem. The rst one is the
insurance e¤ect implying that the bank wants to insure against the increased risk
and the second one is the protability e¤ect which comes through from the fact
that higher risk means higher return from the banks investment. This model,
in contrast to other models in the literature, is not facing the issue of not bind-
ing capital requirements conditions as,according to the results the banks optimal
choice for capital is always higher than the capital requirements:
The policy implications derived from this model are that it is possible for the
regulator, by following a more stringent policy, to lead the banks to increase capital
and the risk that the bank undertakes. This will happen in order for the return
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on their investment to compensate for the cost associated with raising capital to
maintain their capital bu¤er. Whats more, the fact the banks will need to increase
their capital means that they will have less available funds to invest. This could
potentially mean less loans available in the economy which would consequently
hinder economic growth. Additionally, a decrease in capital requirements would
bring a more than proportional decrease in capital than in risk. These implications
would clearly show that the policy could backre since the regulator should be
aiming for nancial stability and economic growth. The question that arises is
whether the bank is more stable after the change in capital requirements.
Even though it captures the e¤ect of capital requirements on the banks cap-
ital and risk level that is frequently found in the empirical literature, this simple
static model has limitations. Firstly, it does not distinguish among the various
available loans and investments for the bank, which are accompanied by di¤erent
risk weights in Basel II and III, which would allow us to observe the risk shifting
behaviour of the bank in response to changes in capital requirements. Also, since
this is not a dynamic model it does not allow to observe how will the bank be-
have in the next period if it had to incur the sanction for not meeting the capital
requirements which could lead to losses. This would a¤ect next periods available
wealth,which in turn would inuence its decision for investment. Finally, for future
research, from this theoretical model it is possible to extract a reduced form model
which will be the basis of an emprical application using bank-specic data.
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Appendices
A Unique solution conditions
I rst examine the sign for the EUkk and EUxx. Their mathematical expressions
for this model are
@2E(U(jk; x))
@k2
=
Z k
k
 1
= 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 00[(k; x)  C(k; k; )](2+ 1  rx)2g(r)f()drd
+
Z 1
= k
k
 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 00((k; x))(  rx)2g(r)f()drd (8)
  k
k2
Z 1
r= 1
U 0[(k; x)  C(k; k; )]k
k
f(
k
k
  1)g(r)dr
and
@2E(U(jk; x))
@x2
=
Z 1
= k
k
 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 00((k; x))[r(1  k)]2g(r)f()drd (9)
+
Z k
k
 1
= 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 00[(k; x)  C(k; k; )][r(1  k)]2g(r)f()drd
By using that in this model U 0 > 0 and U 00 < 0 and that by denition k  0 &
k  0 & f(k
k
  1)  0 we can easily see that both these expressions are negative
which means that the solutions for k and x are maximum.
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B Second-order conditions
In the theory section I have considered that @
2E(U(jk;x))
@k@k
> 0 and @
2E(U(jk;x))
@x@k
> 0:
I begin with the rst one which shows the impact of k on the capitals expected
utility. Intuitively I expect this to be positive as by increasing capital require-
ments, the capital ratio that the bank holds increases which in turn decreases the
probability of ending up in the sanction case. Mathematically to show that it is
positive I use that U 0 > 0 and U 00 < 0: When taking the derivative of @E(U(jk;x))
@k
with respect to k we have:
@2E(U(jk; x))
@k@k
=
1
k
Z 1
r= 1
U 0[(k; x)  C(k; k; )]k
k
f(
k
k
  1)g(r)dr (10)
+
Z k
k
 1
= 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 00[(k; x)  C(k; k; )](2+ 1  rx)g(r)f()drd
The rst term is not negative since U 0 > 0 and by denition k  0 & k  0
& f(k
k
  1)  0. The second term is positive since U 00 < 0 and 2 + 1   rx is
expected to be positive as in the sanction case the payo¤ from capital needs to
be greater than the one from the investment to motivate the bank to hold some
capital, otherwise the bank would choose no capital and compensate the penalty
by the return of the risky asset(rx). The second SOC shows the impact of k on the
risks expected utility. Intuitively I expect this to be positive as. The expression
showing that is:
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@2E(U(jk; x))
@x@k
=  
Z k
k
 1
= 1
Z 1
r= 1
U 00[(k; x)  C(k; k; )]r(1  k)g(r)f()drd
(11)
Using again the fact that U 00 < 0 and based on denition 1   k > 0; I expect
@2E(U(jk;x))
@x@k
> 0 as on average r is expected to be positive.
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Chapter 3
The e¤ect of bank capital surplus/decit on
loans: Evidence from Commercial banks in the
UK
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Abstract
Following the recent nancial crisis there has been an increase of interest in un-
derstanding how capital requirements a¤ect credit supply and the banks asset
management, in order to avoid similar credit crunches in the future. Most stud-
ies only attempt to explain the impact on total lending and not on the various
types of lending to di¤erent sectors. This chapter contributes to the literature by
examining the impact of changes in regulation on various types of loans and capi-
tal growth through a Gap index which measures the distance between the banks
internal target and actual capital ratio. I nd that with an increase in capital
requirements the banks adjust their loan portfolio according to the risk weights
in Basel II. Specically, they decrease the loans with the high risk weight (i.e.
commercial and consumer loans) and increase the ones with the low risk weight
(i.e. real estate and Interbank loans) while increasing their total capital. Com-
paring the perios before, during and after crisis I nd that the banks adjust their
loan portfolio similarly before and after but more sharply during the crisis. Fur-
thermore, they have a much strong reaction to capital requirements changes when
adapting their capital ratios after crisis compared to before and during. Finally,
There is evidence of the procyclicality e¤ects of capital requirements as I nd a
negative relationship between GDP growth and capital growth.
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1 Introduction
As a response to the various crises globally and to the regulatory reforms over the
past three decades, researchers have attempted to analyse the resulting contraction
of loan supply using, what is referred to in the literature as, the bank capital
channel. What it shows is the linkage between a banks capital structure and its
credit supply. In their attempt to examine this lending channel, they have used a
capital gap index which is the di¤erence between the actual capital ratio that the
bank holds and an internal capital ratio target that it has (e.g. Hancock andWilcox
(1993,1994), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Francis and Osborne (2009,2010)). The
credit crunch witnessed in the recent nancial crisis can be partly explained by the
bank capital channelfor the transferal of nancial shocks into the real economy.
The idea behind this gap index is that if there is a capital shortfall, then banks
will need to alter their balance sheet to close that gap and attain their internal tar-
get capital ratio. There are three (Basel II and III which are di¤erent risk weights
for the various banks assets) ways they can do that. The rst one is to adjust the
numerator of their capital ratio by increasing core capital. Alternatively, they can
reduce their risk exposure to decrease the ratios denominator by restructuring
their security portfolio or by limiting their loan supply to the economy. Since,
especially in the short run, it is di¢ cult and costly to raise capital, banksoptimal
adjustment is more likely to be a reduction in loan supply. This will increase the
cost of nancing for rms and households with signicant implications on ina-
tion, investment and economic growth. Obviously, these results will become more
severe during a crisis when credit is limited and capital becomes more expensive
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(because of increased demand). This makes the supervision and understanding of
bankscapital gap and the banks capital and asset management very important
for stability and for conducting monetary policy.
Banking regulation, including capital requirements, has a positive and signi-
cant impact on changes in bank capital (Alfon et al. (2004), Akinsoyinu (2015)).
More specically, the banks decide to keep additional capital on top of the min-
imum regulator requirements since they expect that they may need to in a time
of economic distress and they know that it will be very di¢ cult to raise it then.
There is evidence (Repullo and Suarez (2012)) to support that they will do so
even if that means that they will miss some protable lending opportunities to-
day. These are pieces of evidence in favor of a theory ("capital bu¤er theory")
which has frequently been used by researchers to explain the relationship between
capital and lending, which is in line with the internal target capital ratios.
In most studies which use the target capital ratios, the researchers only at-
tempt to explain the impact of capital surpluses on total lending and not on the
various types of lending to di¤erent sectors. Also, the majority of the research in
this literature has looked at a period that stops before the nancial crisis or just
covers the rst 2-3 years of it. In this chapter, the data I use cover the period
of economic booming and deregulation before 2007 starting from 1999 ,the nan-
cial crisis (2007-2009) and the recovery period with the stringent regulations and
capital requirements afterward until 2016. This chapter also contributes in the
literature looking at the impact of the capital surpluses/decits on the di¤erent
types of loans (commercial, consumer, real estate, interbank and other loans) by
disaggregating the total loans for the commercial banks in the U.K..The results
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show that the commercial banks, in response to an increase in the distance be-
tween actual and desired capital ratio (i.e. increase in gap), increase their more
risky loans (commercial and consumer) and decrease the ones which carry less
weight as risk weighted assets. At the same time they choose to decrease their
total and Tier 1 capital.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The summary of the
relevant literature is discussed in Section two. The data and methodology used
to analyse the impact of capital surplus/decit on lending and capital growth
are described in Section three. The results from the analysis are reported and
explained in Section four. Section ve concludes.
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2 Literature review
Theoretically, there can be arguments about the any direction and size of the e¤ect
of a change in bank capital on bank assets and credit supply. For example, one
can imagine that a large bank that has easier access to funding for its capital
in case it needs to rapidly increase it or an already well-capitalised bank will be
able to absorb capital losses without having to reduce its assets and its lending
capacity. On the other hand, It can be the case that banks are constantly managing
their assets in order to maintain a constant capital ratio (and potentially a capital
bu¤er), because, as capital can be very costly to raise (especially in a turbulent
period when many banks need it at the same time), they cannot raise enough
equity to counteract declines in their capital which only leaves them the option
of reducing their risk weighted assets (among which are loans). Finally, even if
the bank can cover the cost of increasing its capital, it could potentially send a
negative signal to the shareholders and to the market that it needs a capital top-up
since it has become too risky for its current level of capital ratio. To examine these
cases for the di¤erent periods and countries, the researchers have focused on the
relationship between capital ratio and lending and the existence of internal target
capital ratios and a bank capital channel.
According to the ModiglianiMiller theorems (Modigliani and Miller(1958)),
the banks, except for bankruptcy costs, do not focus on their assets portfolio and
capital ratios or their interaction. However, theoretical and empirical research has
shown that this does not hold and banks consider the cost of holding capital and
that is a¤ecting their portfolio choices. Since it is costly to raise capital, and the
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bank has an internal capital ratio target to meet, it could reduce its risky assets.
The most signicant risky asset, because of its impact on the economy, the bank
can reduce is credit supply (e.g. Van den Heuvel (2004), Gambacorta and Mistrulli
(2004)). Similarly, according to Adrian and Shin (2008), banks can have a target
level of leverage, and in order to reach it after a negative shock to capital (e.g.
capital requirements) they would reduce loan supply, leading to procyclical e¤ects
of bank capital management. By procyclical e¤ects it is meant that in recessions,
losses decrease the bankscapital and, as witnessed in the recent nancial crisis,
the higher capital requirements that are following it magnify the consequences.
If banks cannot recapitalise quickly enough then, because of the new regulations
and the turbulent economic environment, their lending capacity can get seriously
weakened and this could give rise to a credit crunch.
Some early studies, in conjunction with signicant economic events (US reces-
sion in 1990), have provided results which prompted an interest in the study of
the connection between capital ratios and loansgrowth. For example, Bernanke
and Lown (1991), to study this relationship they use large and small banks in New
Jersey from that period. Their results show that a shortage of capital restricted
the small banksability to supply loans, even though much of the slowdown was
attributed to the decrease in demand from the recession. Two more papers which
are have being used as examples in recent literature are the ones by Hancock and
Wilcox (1993, 1994) who examine the bank capital channel more directly. They
use US bank data to estimate the relationship between bank capitalization and
bank-level loan growth, while accounting for loan demand. They dene the banks
capitalisation as the di¤erence between actual and targeted capital levels and they
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explain that banks that are close to their target their lending will be more sensi-
tive to capital shocks than those banks with relatively high capital surplus. They
use in their approach capital adjustment costs to explain why banks need time to
adjust to their targeted level.
Heid et al. (2004) examine, for the period between 1993-2000, how the German
savings bankschoices for risk and capital altered after changes in capital regulation
to test the capital bu¤er theory. They nd that the degree and the nature of these
adjustments depends on the size of the excess capital that they hold on top of
the minimum capital requirements. Specically, banks with high capital bu¤ers
try to sustain it by adjusting both their capital and their risk toward the same
direction(i.e. both increase or decrease). On the other hand, banks with low
capital bu¤ers focus primarily on topping up their capital bu¤er after the increase
in capital requirements and at the same time they decrease their risk. Reporting
again results from the German banks, Memmel and Raupach (2010) are the rst
to use the partial adjustment method for the capital for each bank individually
by using monthly data. They nd evidence that a target capital ratio exists for
a large percentage of the banks and that banks with a high target capital ratio
also have a high asset volatility and/or a high adjustment speed for their capital.
Accordingly, banks with low target capital ratios had low asset volatilities and a
high adjustment speed.
Following Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994), Berrospide and Edge (2010) use
US lending data for large US bank holding companies (BHCs) between covering
the period 1992-2008 and nd modest e¤ects(annual loan growth of 25 basis points
for every one percent increase in capital surplus) of bank capitalization on lend-
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ing growth. They too, use a gap index to show the distance between a banks
actual capital ratio and its desired ratio, in a model of lending growth, controlling
for a number of bank-specic and macroeconomic variables. They interpret the
coe¢ cient on the gap variable as the elasticity of lending growth to changes in
bank capital surplus/shortfall. Lastly, they document for banks with higher level
of excess capital the growth rate of total loans is greater.
Researchers in a more recent literature (Francis and Osborne (2009,2010), Ai-
yar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2012,2013)) are using a dataset with condential
data about the individual capital requirements for the UK banks,covering the
period before the crisis (1998-2007), to examine the response from changes in min-
imum capital requirements to lending supply. To begin with, Francis and Osborne
(2009) use bank-level data for the UK banks to estimate a partial adjustment
long-run internal target risk-weighted capital ratio which they found to be a func-
tion of the individual capital requirements set by the regulators and a number of
explanatory variables. They further nd a negative relationship between capital
ratios and the economic cycle using the real GDP growth, which is also consistent
with my results.
Francis and Osborne (2010) explain that for a bank capital channel to exist
and to have signicant implications for the economy, the banks should not hold
enough capital to absorb any unexpected regulatory changes, capital should be
costly to raise rapidly and that the banks play a key role to credit availability in
the economy. In order to nd if such a channel exists in the UK they examine
whether capital requirements, through their impact on the banks actual capital
ratio, a¤ects the lending supply. By using the internal target capital ratio and its
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distance from the actual capital ratio(as in Francis and Osborne (2009)), they nd
that the capital surpluses (decits) have positive (negative) association with the
growth rate of loans, RWA and total assetsnegative (positive) correlation with
the growth rate of regulatory capital and tier 1 capital. This is again in line with
what I nd in my analysis.
Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2012) attempt to identify whether the capital
requirements were binding on bank behaviour, in the sense that the risk-weighted
capital ratios move according to the capital ratio requirements over time. To do so
they sorted the banks into quartiles based on the excess capital ratio that they were
holding on top of the minimum capital requirement (capital bu¤er). They found
that for all four groups, signicant and sizable co-movement between minimum
requirements and actual capital ratios which was associated with the variation in
minimum capital requirements. These results are in accordance with the ndings
from other studies examined in this literature review for the UK banks(Alfon et
al. (2005), Francis and Osborne (2009), and Bridges et al. (2013)).
The components a¤ecting the bankscapital bu¤er and its impact on lending
and capital level(and growth) have received an increase in interest in the acad-
emic literature since the beginning of the nancial crisis (e.g. Maurin and Toiva-
nen(2012), Bridges et al. (2014),Noss and To¤ano (2014) and de-Ramon et al.
(2016)). All these studies also use a partial adjustment model of capital ratio
toward the target capital ratio of the banks to analyse empirically the banking
sectors in the UK, the US and the Euro area.
Firstly, Maurin and Toivanen (2012), provide evidence of the impact of capital
gap on lending and portfolio management from banks in the euro area (for the
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rst time) for the period 2005-2011. They rst positively associate the banks
balance sheet risk with its target capital ratio. Then, they show evidence of a
certain hierarchy in the way the bank is adjusting its risky assets by documenting
a more sizeable impact of the adjustment procedure toward higher capital ratios
on security holdings compared to loans. Noss and To¤ano (2014) use a VaR model
(closely related to the one in Berrospide and Edge (2010) which they augment by
using sign restrictions) to estimate the e¤ect of changes in capital requirements
applied to all UK-resident banks on lending by studying the joint dynamics of
the aggregate capital ratio of the UK banking system and a set of macro-nancial
variables. They nd that an increase in the aggregate bank capital requirement
during an economic upswing is associated with a decrease in lending greater for
lending to rms than to households.
De-Ramon et al. (2016) use condential regulatory returns data for the UK
banking industry from 1989-2013 to nd the association between capital require-
ments and the banks capitalisation level and then the e¤ect of the latter on the
growth rate of its assets (loans, RWA, total assets) and its capital (total regulatory
capital and Tier 1). They use the gap index to do so and the focus of their paper
is whether the nancial crisis has been a structural break in the way the banks
manage their capital and assets in response to changes in regulation. Their initial
ndings are in agreement with the previous studies, namely, they nd a positive re-
lationship between bankscapital ratios and capital requirements and that it holds
even when the requirements are not binding. The signicant nding of their study
is that there is some di¤erence between before and after crisis adjustments of the
bankss capital and assets growth rate to the regulatory changes. Specically, they
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show that banks post crisis placed more weight on overall asset de-leveraging and
that they increased better quality capital (Tier 1) signicantly more in response
to higher capital requirements. On the contrary they do not nd an equivalent
change for the e¤ects of capital requirements on lending and risk-weighted asset
growth after the crisis.
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3 Data and Methodology
In this section, I explain the dependent and explanatory variables that I will be
using in the estimation models in addition to the data and the sources that I am
using. I then explain the approach I followed to estimate the target capital ratio
for each bank in my sample. The second step is to calculate the gap index which is
the measure of bank capitalization and it is showing the capital surplus or decit
the bank has compared to that internal target. The last step is to go through
the model which I am using to estimate the e¤ect that the capital surplus/decit
has on the banks loans, other assets and capital growth. Finally, I explain the
estimation technique and the reasons why I have used it.
3.1 Data sources and variable denitions
Since the focus of my chapter is the lending supply, I concentrate on examining
the behaviour of UK commercial banks, which have typically played a large role
in supplying credit to consumers and rms in the economy. More specically,
to limit the heterogeneity among the banks in my sample I only use the large
commercial banks which operate domestically with total assets over £ 1 billion.
Banks specialising in investment or private banks or banks which have most of
their operations abroad are not included as they are a lot more exposed to risks
from the international markets and they could subject to a set of regulations in
other countries as well inuencing their capitalisation and lending strategy. I
further restrict the sample by eliminating any banks which were not active during
the nancial crisis and banks which o¤er less than 10 years worth of observations
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in order to account for a complete business cycle. The data reported are at the
unconsolidated level because in the UK the individual capital requirements are
at the level of the individual as well as at the group (consolidated) level. This
means that individual banks inside a banking group will need to adjust their asset
portfolio and capital to meet the regulators requirements and the individuals
behaviour is of interest in this analysis. The initial sample included 32 UK banks
which are characterised as commercial banks from Bankscope database, however
as explained, they have either a large part of the operations abroad or a small part
of their operations involves domestic lending. After applying these restrictions the
number of banks left in the sample is 16 covering for the period 1999-2016.. The
sample still contains the largest banks which hold a high percentage of the market
share (more than 90% of the market share is held by the top 20 banks based on
their asset size as shown in Figure 1). Therefore, it includes these banks which
are of most interest to a regulator concerned with nancial stability which makes
this sample representative. All the data used in this analysis (apart from the GDP
growth which is sourced by the World Banks World Governance Indicators(WDI))
are sourced by S&P CapitalIQ.
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Source: www.cml.org.uk
Next I dene the variables I use for my estimations. For the target capital ratio
(Equation 6) I use:
Tier 1 Capital Ratio % : Tier 1 Capital as a percentage of Total Risk-Weighted
Assets of the Bank. Tier 1 capital includes the sum of a banks equity capital, and
its disclosed reserves and non-redeemable, non-cumulative preferred stock.
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio % : The ratio of total risk-based capital to risk-
weighted assets. The total risk-based capital ratio is the total of the core capital
ratio.
ROE % : Amount of net income returned for the company as a percentage of
average total equity. This variable measures the companys protability. Calcu-
lated as:[ Net Income / Average total equity of Current and Prior Period] * 100.
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Total equity includes Common Equity and Preferred Equity.
Trading Book (TB) % : Assets held by a bank that are regularly traded over
Total assets.
Provision for loan losses% : The periodic expense for possible future loan losses.
Could be negative when there is a recovery of loan losses. May include other
provisions if they are not disclosed separately.
For the estimation of the e¤ect of Gap on di¤erent assets and capital growth(Equation
8) I use:
Net Charge-O¤s % : Ratio of actual loan losses charged-o¤ in the period
to average total loans (in percentage). Calculated as: (AnnualizedActualLoan-
Losses/AverageTotalLoan)*100.
Interbank loans: Short-term interest-earning loans to banks except the central
bank. Includes call loans, receivables from other banks. Includes federal funds
sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell. Include Federal funds
sold and repurchase agreements. Includes deposits at interest with other banks.
Real Estate loans: Represents commercial real estate loans, construction loans
and multi-family real estate loans. Also includes 1 - 4 Family Real Estate Loans,
Real Estate Mortgage loans and loans given for the construction of residential
houses.
Commercial Loans: Loans for commercial and/or industrial uses. Includes
agricultural loans and nancing transactions with commercial clients, i.e. bills
of exchange, bills discounted, overdrafts, and other bills. Construction loans are
shown net of undisturbed loans in process. Includes short-term loans. Includes
Money Market Loans.
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Consumer Loans: Loans for consumer and/or individual uses. Includes install-
ment loans, credit card loans, installment loans are net of unearned income and
deferred loan fees. Gross of provision for loan losses.
Other loans represents loans given by the Bank other than Commercial Domes-
tic Loans, Construction Loans, Commercial Mortgage Loans, Residential Mortgage
Loans, Consumer Loans, Foreign Loans, and Lease Financing.
Total Assets (SIZE): The total of all short and long-term assets as reported on
the Balance Sheet. This is the sum of Cash & bank balances, Fed funds sold &
resale agreements, Investments for Trade and Sale, Net loans, Investments held to
maturity, Net xed assets, other assets, CustomersAcceptances and Liabilities.
Other assets: Total assets - Total loans.
GDPG % : Real annual percentage growth rate of GDP on local currency.
In Table 1 below we nd the descriptive statistics on the variables used in this
chapter. The average capital ratio for my sample is 13.58 percent which is higher
than the minimum capital requirement of 8 percent. This is consistent with the
capital bu¤er theory explained earlier which states that the banks hold a bu¤er
over the minimum requirement to reduce the associated costs from a sudden change
in regulation policy. Also, the percentage of tier 1 capital of the total capital is
high showing that the quality of the capital the commercial banks in the sample
hold is of high quality. Combined with the fact that many of the banks in the
sample can be considered as large banks (using the average Total Assets) it shows
that large banks hold higher quality capital and that they do not hold very high
capital ratios (de-Ramon (2016) record capital ratio of 18.3 percent for a sample
including more small and medium banks) as they have easier access to funding
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and they have more diversied portfolios. However, the high capital ratios are
mainly driven by the period after the nancial crisis and most of its increase is
attributed to the decrease of RWA (risk weighted assets) rather than the increase
in capital when I divide the sample into pre and post crisis. Furthermore, from
the percentage of Trading Book to Total Assets we see that some banks do not
hold, almost, at all any liquid assets while the average value of 17.7 percent shows
a moderate share of their business. However, this is an average value of before
and after crisis. Before 2009 the average was 18.2 percent and after the crisis the
average fell to 16.9 percent. Before 2008, many banks had placed a lot of assets
that looked like they belonged in the banking book (in some cases CDOs) into
the trading book, possibly to take advantage of lower capital requirements. This
issue was recognised by the Basel Committee in 2009 and it thorough reviewed
the trading book. The extreme values of the average loan growths show the credit
boom before the crisis and its devastating results.
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Variables Observations Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Total risk based Capital ratio 282 13.58 3.57 1.3 27.1
Tier1 Capital/Total Capital 279 72.89 20.11 10.05 83.02
Loan Provisions/Total Assets 288 0.92 3.3 -0.92 32.53
ROE 288 9.35 17.7 -41.45 64.37
Trading Book/Total Assets 259 17.67 8.77 0.17 42.91
Total Assets(£Millions) 288 577461.9 698668 1208.1 1992218
Commercial loans growth 270 2.22 4.75 -35.99 35.06
Consumer loans growth 226 5.01 5.42 -53.03 48.35
Real Estate loans growth 185 5.46 0.87 -6.79 6.33
Interbank  loans growth 267 2.36 5.71 -34.03 20.95
Other loans growth 181 -0.9 0.87 -4.85 6.99
Other Assets growth 240 1 5.61 -25.34 28.82
Capital growth 224 8.1 14.21 -15.66 45.09
Tier 1 growth 253 2.4 20.82 -41.39 45.16
Charge_Off 241 0.68 0.79 -0.45 6.29
Change in Provisions 273 0.01 1.37 -8.45 17.89
GDPG 288 2.07 1.79 -4.33 3.74
Table 1: Summary statistics
3.2 Target capital ratio estimation
Alfon et al.(2004), after interviewing banks and building societies in the UK con-
clude that rms di¤erentiate between their desired level of capital and their actual
level of capital. In order to model each banks target capital ratio (kb;t) I follow
the literature (e.g. Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994), Francis and Osborne (2009),
Berrospide and Edge (2010), Maurin and Toivanen (2012), de-Ramon(2016)) and
I use the notation from the latest paper (i.e. de-Ramon(2016)). The target ratio
is estimated as a function of a explanatory variables Xn;b;t (the variables included
along with the justication for using them can be found below when explaining
Equation 6) including bank specic factors and a constant (b) for each bank which
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captures idiosyncratic factors such as business model, management, risk aversion
and the mix of markets in which the bank operates. This specication takes the
following form:
kb;t = b +
NX
n=1
nXn;b;t (1)
For the next step it needs to be assumed that, because the cost of raising capital
is high, the banks do not immediately adjust their capital and assets to changes in
their target capital ratio. They do so gradually and it is time-consuming so they
are following a partial adjustment process as found in Berrospide and Edge (2008)
and Hancock and Wilcox (1994). As a result, the change in the capital ratio in
each period is a function of the gap between the target and actual capital ratio in
the previous period:
kb;t   kb;t 1 = (kb;t 1   kb;t 1) + b;t (2)
where kb;t 1 is the actual capital ratio of bank b at time t-1,  is the adjustment
speed at which kb;t reaches its target kb;t, and b;t is the error term. For the partial
adjustment model to be meaningful  2 (0; 1), since a value of  = 0 would mean
that the bank is not adjusting its capital to its target at all and  = 1 would mean
that it adjusts it within one time period which would contradict the assumption of
the model. Another assumption is that  is the same for all banks. Substituting
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(1) into (2) and rearranging results in the model below and its estimation outputs
are shown in Table 2:
kb;t = (1  )kb;t 1 + (b +
NX
n=1
nXn;b;t 1) + b;t (3)
For the long-run parameters, b and n, from the results of estimating (3),
taking into account the implied value of the adjustment speed. To bring it in a
form which will be closer to the one I estimate we can rewrite (3) as:
kb;t = Ab + A1kb;t 1 +
NX
n=1
BnXn;b;t 1 + b;t (4)
where Ab = b, A1 = (1   ) and Bn = n, so to get the long run e¤ect of
each explanatory variable is given by:
n =
Bn

(5)
I will now specify what are the explanatory variables included in the Xn;b;t
vector. Following again the studies which have used the above partial adjustment
model I use some of the variables which they have found to be signicant in
estimating the target ratio. First, to account for the cost of capital, I include
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the return on equity (ROE). One important factor considered by Estrella (2004)
is the cost for rms of holding capital, although in practice measurement of this
cost is di¢ cult. Prior studies (e.g. Ayuso et al. (2004); Bikker and Metzemakers
(2004); Stolz and Wedow (2005); Jokipii and Milne (2008)) employ banksreturn
on equity (roe), the ratio of post-tax earnings to book equity, as a proxy of the
direct opportunity cost of holding equity capital. Under this cost interpretation,
we expect to observe a negative relationship between risk-based capital ratios and
the ROE variable. Then, the ratio of tier 1 capital to total regulatory capital
(tier1) is used to account for the quality of the capital held by the bank. It
also is a proxy for the cost of capital, since if it is more costly for banks to adjust
equity, then we expect that cost-minimizing banks will hold higher total risk-based
capital ratios and, therefore, to observe a positive correlation between risk-based
capital ratios and tier1. To control for di¤erent business models in banks with
large trading books, which could make the bank riskier, I add the ratio of trading
book assets to total assets (tb). To proxy for the riskiness of the bank, I use
a measure that shows the banks own estimation of risk, as it is the expected
future loan losses. More specically I use the ratio of loss provisions to total assets
(provision). Finally, it is expected that larger banks tend to hold smaller capital
bu¤ers as they have a greater ability to diversify their portfolio and better access
to funding sources(which also reduces the cost of capital) I add the log of total
assets to proxy for the banks size (size). Previous studies have found signicant
evidence in support of this e¤ect (e.g. Alfon et al. (2004) Stolz and Wedow
(2005) and Jokippi and Milne (2008)). We expect the association between risk-
based capital ratios and size to be negative, since larger rms may achieve greater
economies of scale in screening risky borrowers and better diversication of risk
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across asset classes and geographic locations. To proxy for the potentially higher
costs associated with adjusting equity capital (e.g., direct transaction and indirect
signalling costs that could adversely impact share prices), previous studies (e.g.
Alfon et al. (2004) Wong et al. (2005)) have also included lagged values of the
capital ratio (kb;t 1). These variables transform (4) into the baseline target capital
model that I estimate:
kb;t = Ab + A1kb;t 1 +Broeroeb;t 1 +Btbtbb;t 1 +Bprovisionprovisionb;t 1 (6)
+Btier1tier1b;t 1 +Bsizesizeb;t 1 + b;t
3.3 Capital surplus/decit index
After estimating the target capital ratio, I construct the capital surplus/decit
measure for each bank. I calculate the target ratios for each bank using the
long-run coe¢ cients derived (using equation (5)) with the short-run parameters
estimated in equation (4) and applying them to the target capital model set out
in equation (1). A banks capital surplus or decit in terms of the actual capital
ratio relative to this target capital ratio is calculated as:
Gapb;t = 100 
"
(
kb;t
kb;t
)  1
#
(7)
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If the Gap is negative(positive) it means that the bank has a lower(higher)
capital ratio that its desired long-run capital ratio target. This would mean that
in order to reach its target it can decrease(increase) its assets(e.g. by decreasing
lending supply or by increasing the lending interest rates or by investing in less
risky assets) or/and increase(decrease) its capital level (e.g. by issuing new equity
or by retaining prots or by decreasing dividend payouts). Figure 2 below shows
the average Gap for each bank over time. For the part before the nancial crisis
commercial banks seemed to hold higher capital ratios than their desired ones (the
line is above 0). From 2007 to 2010 they is a decrease in their Gap leading to a
capital decit (the line is below 0). This can be attributed to the initial decrease of
their capital because of loan losses or/and to changes in their target ratio because
the nancial crisis created a very risky and unstable economic environment. After
2010, the average line is increasing and it stays in positive values after making the
adjustments that I examine below.
The green and red lines show the 75th percentile and 25th percentile, respec-
tively. The important di¤erence between the two lines is the crisis period. The
better capitalised banks compared to their target (i.e. green line) do not seem
to negatively a¤ected on average during that period showing that they probably
had a highly diversied portfolio and easy access to capital. The worse capitalised
banks compared to their target (i.e. red line) were shocked by the nancial crisis,
creating signicant capital decits. In response they had to drastically alter their
portfolio composition and/or raise substantial amounts of capital with potentially
signicant consequences to their prots and cash ows. An optimistic sign about
the future is that all three lines converge to positive and high capital surpluses,
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reinforcing the belief that today commercial banks in the UK are becoming well
capitalised again.
3.4 Baseline model and Methodology
After calculating the Gap index, I regress the following model to examine the
signicance of the lagged dependent variable. The estimated persistence of the
lagged dependent variable, expressed by its coe¢ cient, is signicant for all types
of assets examined here. This analysis suggests that the growth rate of assets and
capital is best characterised by a dynamic, autoregressive process. Thus, I use
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the following dynamic model to estimate the e¤ect that the Gap index has on the
banks loan portfolio and capital growth1 :
n
 lnAssetsj;b;t
 lnCapitalg;b;t
o
= b + j
n
 lnAssetsj;b;t 1
 lnCapitalj;b;t 1
o
+ GapGapb;t 1 + PROV PROV ISIONSb;t
+COCHARGEOFFb;t + GDPGGDPGb;t 1 + b;t (8)
where  lnAssetsj;b;t is the annual growth rate at time t of the jth asset ex-
amined here (i.e. Commercial loans, Consumer loans, Real estate loans, Other
loans and Other assets) for bank b. The  lnCapitalj;b;t is the annual growth
rate at time t of the gth capital examined here (i.e. Total regulatory Capital
and Tier 1 capital) for bank b. I also include the gap index that I calculated
earlier. The Gapb;t 1 variable is the main variable of interest in this specication
and if it increases then this means that the banks capital surplus(decit) is in-
creased(decreased). A signicant coe¢ cient for the Gapb;t 1 would mean that the
bank is altering its asset composition(or capital), in order to close the gap between
the actual and the desired capital ratio. Moreover, to proxy for the banks own
estimate of asset risk I include the change in the ratio of loss provisions to total
assets (PROV ISIONSb;t) and higher (lower) ratios suggest more (less) risk.
Potentially, what can be said is that a negative association with capital ratios
may interline moral hazard behaviour. Alternatively, a positive association may
1The Gap index might be subject to a generated variables bias as explained by Pagan (1984).
It can bias the standard errors upwards, making it possible to reject the statistical signicance
of the Gap coe¢ cient even though it is signicant (Type 2 error). In this case the Gap index
(in the results from table 4 & 5) is signicant which means that even if a generated variable
bias exists it is not large enough to make its coe¢ cient insignicant, so it is not inuencing the
results substantially.
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imply evidence of market discipline. The ratio of the net charge-o¤s of a bank
over its total assets (CHARGEOFFb;t) is included to control for bank-specic
credit conditions. To account for changes in the macroeconomic conditions and
demand for credit during the business cycle, I include the lagged annual real GDP
growth (GDPGb;t 1). A variable capturing international risk (VIX) was also in-
cluded in the specication, however it was only signicant at the 10% signicance
level for the capital growth so it was removed. This is in contrast to what was
found in the de-Ramon et al. (2016) paper, where VIX was also included in a
similar specication and it was signicant for the capital and total assets. The
di¤erence is that in their paper they include a number of investment banks with
international operations and commercial banks which have a signicant part of
their operations abroad, which is making them more vulnerable to international
risk than the commercial banks in my sample. Lastly b;t is the error term.
In order to test whether the e¤ect of the Gap index has changed during the crisis
or after the crisis compared with its e¤ect before 2008 I construct the following
specication:
n
 lnAssetsj;b;t
 lnCapitalg;b;t
o
= b + j
n
 lnAssetsj;b;t 1
 lnCapitalj;b;t 1
o
+ (1 + 2Dcr + 3Dpost)GapGapb;t 1 (9)
+PROV PROV ISIONSb;t + COCHARGEOFFb;t + GDPGGDPGb;t 1
+Dcr +Dpost + b;t
where Dcr is a dummy variable that gets the value 1 if 2007 < t < 2010 and 0
otherwise and Dpost is a dummy variable that gets the value 1 if t  2010 and 0
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otherwise. The marginal e¤ects of bank capitalization during the crisis and post-
crisis periods are given by 2Dcr and 3Dpost respectively. After the specication is
regressed for the short-run, the coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable is used
to calculate the long-run e¤ect of a change in bank capitalization on the balance
sheet component j. This is expressed by:
#
 lnAssetsj;b;t
 lnCapitalg;b;t
#Gapb;t 1
= 1=(1  j), before crisis
#
 lnAssetsj;b;t
 lnCapitalg;b;t
#Gapb;t 1
= (1 + 2)=(1  j), during crisis
#
 lnAssetsj;b;t
 lnCapitalg;b;t
#Gapb;t 1
= (1 + 2 + 3)=(1  j), after crisis.
3.5 Estimation technique
Because of the small number of banks in my sample and the unbalanced panel in
conjunction with the not very large T (18 years) the available options for estimating
my models are limited and all have weak points which are described here.
Since I focus on the relationship between gap and the growth rate of the banks
assets, I use only three more explanatory variables to account for other things that
will a¤ect the banks asset management. In this case xed e¤ects would be useful
as they would be able to control for unobserved heterogeneity macroeconomic
and demand-side e¤ects at any point in time (e.g. decrease in demand for loans
because of an economic downturn). Even though I include the growth of the GDP
to account for the business cycle, the time xed e¤ects would have been better at
soaking up all factors common to banks without the need to model them. The
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reason why I cannot use them is that I am estimating a dynamic model with the
system GMM approach and using time or bank xed e¤ects, given the number of
observations in my sample, would increase the number of instruments that would
have been used very much (even if there is not exactly a number that makes the
number of instruments "too many") and with the rst di¤erence the xed e¤ects
are removed.
As I mentioned before, the models I am estimating are dynamic which means
that lagged dependent variables are used as regressors. And as shown in my results
in Tables 3, 4 and 5 the lagged dependent variables are (apart form one) signicant
so I should not estimate the model without them. According to Nickell (1981) the
existence of both lagged dependent variables and xed e¤ects causes a well-known
bias. However, Judson and Owen (1999) show that is better to use standard xed
e¤ects estimation rather than GMM in unbalanced panels when T is large (T>30),
as the bias declines as the number of time period increases, and the results of the
estimation will be consistent (given there is no autocorrelation of the error terms).
But as my sample spans for 18 years it is still not large enough to be considered
consistent. An additional issue arises because methods that involve pooling data
(such as the xed e¤ects estimator and other panel methods) assume homogeneity
of coe¢ cients across banks. Pesaran and Smith (1995) suggest using the Mean
Group estimator to tackle this issue. However, the unbalanced nature of my panel
means that this estimator is not appropriate. That is because the Mean Group
estimator would give a very large weight to coe¢ cients estimated for banks with
only few observations, leading to very high standard errors. Kiviet (1995) argues
that the best way to handle dynamic panel bias is to perform LSDV(Least Square
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Dummy Variable), then correct the results for the bias, which he nds can be
predicted with great precision. However, the approach he explains works only for
balanced panels and does not address the potential endogeneity of other regressors.
I am using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate
my models which is developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and then improved
by Blundell and Bond (1998). This GMM estimator instruments the di¤erenced
variables that are not strictly exogenous with all their available lags in levels. In
this equation, variables in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own
rst di¤erences. It ensures e¢ ciency and consistency provided that the models
are not subject to serial correlation of order two and that the instruments used
are valid which are tested using the AR(2) and the Sargan/Hansen testing for
the validity of instrument subsets which are o¤ered automatically with the system
GMM method.
I collapse the instrument matrix by using the Windmeijer (2005) error terms to
limit instrument proliferation. I restrict the number of lags to limit the number of
instruments used. Finally, according to Arellano and Bond (1991) and Windmeijer
(2005) the two-step estimated standard errors have a small-sample downward bias
in dynamic panel data setting, which is corrected by applying the Windmeijer
(2005) error terms.
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4 Empirical results
In this section I analyse the results from the estimation of the target capital ratio
and the short-run and long-run e¤ects of the capital surplus/decit on the banks
assets and capital growth. Before that, in Table 2 I nd the Pearsons correlation
matrix. The rst thing to notice is that the Gap (the lag capital surplus/decit)
is negatively associated with the capital and Tier 1 growth and positively corre-
lated(most of them are signicant) with some of the loans which is showing the
banks behaviour in response to changes in the Gap. Also, Provisions and Charge
o¤s brings are positively correlated with Capital and Tier 1 growth and inu-
ence negatively most of the loansgrowth acting as a deterrent. Finally, the GDP
growths negative correlation with Capital growth shows the latters procyclicality.
Variable Gap
Capital
Growth
Tier1
Growth
Commercial
Growth
Consumer
Growth
Real
Estate
Growth
Interbank
Growth
Other Loans
Growth
Other
Assets
Growth
Provissions
change
Charge
Off
-0.4006
(0.0000)
-0.2308 0.2238
(0.0009) (0.001)
0.0422 0.0437 -0.0191
(0.0615) (0.532) (0.7767)
0.0202 0.12 0.04 -0.1438
(0.0959) (0.1066) (0.5786) (0.0311)
-0.0242 0.1252 0.1511 -0.2323 0.7642
(0.0852) (0.1511) (0.0686) (0.002) (0.000)
-0.1111 0.1255 -0.0439 0.0636 0.0141 -0.0797
(0.1049) (0.0681) (0.5006) (0.3299) (0.8407) (0.3304)
-0.0169 -0.2211 0.0352 0.0724 0.1179 0.1374 -0.0994
(0.1431) (0.0084) (0.6636) (0.3438) (0.1622) (0.1397) (0.2125)
0.1059 0.1887 0.0441 0.0979 -0.1076 -0.4372 -0.0549 0.0997
(0.0724) (0.0114) (0.5422) (0.1584) (0.1563) (0.000) (0.429) (0.2462)
-0.046 0.0525 0.0805 -0.0038 -0.0126 -0.0553 -0.0401 -0.074 -0.0008
(0.0082) (0.4437) (0.217) (0.0932) (0.0561) (0.0903) (0.5267) (0.3604) (0.9905)
-0.1093 0.0925 0.1009 -0.0666 -0.113 -0.096 -0.0606 -0.0091 -0.0077 0.0802
(0.1463) (0.0267) (0.1061) (0.3369) (0.1069) (0.2663) (0.0769) (0.9141) (0.9197) (0.0428)
0.1469 -0.1521 -0.137 0.029 -0.0502 0.0053 -0.1754 0.001 0.0666 -0.05679 -0.151
(0.0365) (0.0265) (0.0331) (0.6462) (0.4675) (0.9441) (0.0049) (0.9898) 0.3181 (0.0634) (0.0218)
1
1
1
Table 2: Correlation matrix
Provission change
Charge Off
GDP Growth
1
1
1
1
1
Interbank Growth
Other Loans Growth
Other Assets Growth
1
1
Capital Growth
Tier1 Growth
Commercial Growth
Consumer Growth
Real Estate Growth
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4.1 Capital ratios
In Table 3 below I summarise the short-run for the explanatory variables that
a¤ect capital in equation (6) and the long-run coe¢ cients using equation (7). The
coe¢ cient on the lagged capital ratio implies a moderate adjustment of capital
ratios to target. The estimated average speed of adjustment is around 41% per
time period. This estimate is in line with studies using US data that covers earlier
periods from our study. Berrospide and Edge (2010) and Berger et al. (2008),
nd adjustments speeds between 28%-40% annually. Francis and Osborne (2009)
using UK before the nancial crisis estimate speeds around 30% while de-Ramon
et al. (2016) nd very high speeds around 64%.
For the rest of the bank-specic explanatory variables they all have the expected
sign, however three of them are marginally signicant at the 10% signicance
level. ROE and Tier 1 appear to be highly signicant and they are negatively
and positive correlated with capital ratios respectively. The Return On Equity
is used to proxy capital costs so an increase in ROE increases the opportunity
cost of holding capital, thus justifying the negative sign. The positive relationship
between capital ratios and Tier1, shows as the share of Tier1 capital increases the
banks tend to hold higher total capital as well. This is because it is very costly
to raise this higher quality capital and the banks which have a large percentage of
Tier 1 capital, hold high capital bu¤ers to avoid it.
The sign of the Size adds evidence to the idea that the larger the banks are the
easier and cheaper it is for them to access any additional funding needed and the
better diversied their portfolio is, which allows them to set lower capital bu¤ers
73
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS Chapter 3
than smaller banks. The banks trading book (TB) is positively correlated with the
capital ratio in the long run which implies that the higher the banksinvolvement
is in trading activity the higher their capital ratios tend to be. Lastly, Provisions
for loan losses increase capital ratio indicating that as the banks estimate for its
asset portfolio risk is increasing it chooses to further insure against any potential
negative shocks by raising its capital.
Table 3: Capital target ratios (Short-run and Long-run)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Baseline
Short-run
Baseline
Long-run
Lag Capital 0.591***
(0.084)
Provisions 0.376* 0.92*
(0.174) (0.548)
ROE -0.053*** -0.13***
(0.00558) (0.0129)
TB 0.064* 0.156*
(0.0305) (0.075)
Tier1 0.33*** 0.806***
(0.102) (0.245)
Size -0.199* -0.487*
(0.103) (0.2518)
Constant 1.918* 4.689*
(1.083) (2.648)
Observations 206 206
Number of Banks 16 16
No of instruments 16 16
AR(1) (p-value) 0.004 0.004
AR(2) (p-value) 0.362 0.362
Sargan (p>chi2) 0.000 0.000
Hansen (p>chi2) 0.539 0.539
Prob>F 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. In column (1) the
system GMM regression estimates are reported of the determinants of UK banks'
target capital ratios in Equation (6). The dependent variable is the ratio of the total
capital over the risk weighted assets at time t. In column (2) the long-run
transformation of the results is shown by dividing the coefficients of column (1) by
the capital’s adjustment speed. The adjustment speed is calculated as 1-λ, where
λ is the coefficient of the lagged capital variable from column (1). The p-value of
the Hansen test of validity, the p-value of the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions and the p-value of the first-order autocorrelation test (AR(1) and
AR(2)) are reported. The p-value of the F stat of the equation is shown in the last
row.
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The consistency of the system GMM estimator depends both on the assump-
tions that the error term is not auto-correlated as well as on the number and
validity of the instruments used. In Tables 3, 4 and 5 three important types of
tests are shown. The rst test (AR(1) and AR(2)) examines the hypothesis of
no autocorrelation in the error term. The presence of rst-order autocorrelation
(rejecting the null hypothesis for the AR(1)) in the rst di¤erence does not imply
that the estimates are inconsistent. However, the presence of second-order auto-
correlation (rejecting the null hypothesis for the AR(2)) implies that the estimates
are inconsistent. The second one is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions.
Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the results are weakened by the use of
many instruments. The third one is a Hansen test, which examines the validity of
the instruments. Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the instruments used
are not robust. In all these tables (3, 4 & 5) the AR(1) test and the Sargan test
are rejected and the AR(2) test and Hansen test cannot be rejected at 10% signif-
icance level and in most cases at 1% and 5% signicance level. These results from
the tests do not indicate a reason to question the validity of the instruments used
or the consistency of the estimates.
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4.2 Portfolio adjustments to capital surplus/decit
In this section, I use the target capital ratios from above to construct the Gap
index (capital surplus/decit) to analyse the short-run and , more importantly,
the long-run e¤ects that it has on the di¤erent types of loans, other assets and
capital growth. The results of the estimations are shown below in Table 4 for
the short-run e¤ects and in Table 5 for the long-run e¤ects. As explained before,
the gap index shows the distance between actual capital ratio and target ratio for
each bank. Based on the way the Gap has been calculated, a positive gap would
mean that the bank has a capital surplus compared to its desired one and it tends
to decrease the former in order to reach that internal target ratio. Consequently,
what is expected when the gap is positive is for the bank to try to adjust its asset
by decreasing the capital that it holds and/or increase the amount of loans and
other assets (and potentially its level of risk) in its balance sheet to benet from
their expected return. In both tables we see this behaviour from the commercial
UK banks in my sample.
More specically, we have the main variable of interest (Gap) which appears
to be signicant for almost all the assets apart from the Interbank loans. Given
that, the important part becomes the sign of its impact on the growth rates of
these assets. In most studies(e.g. Francis and Osborne (2009), de-Ramon (2016))
which examine the impact of the gap on the growth of total loans and assets the
sign is positive. From the results found in the Tables 4 and 5 the sign for total
loans growth is unclear but it is not important as this is not the focus of this work.
However, what is of interest in this study is that with the specication in Equation
(8) we can see the way the banks adjust their loan portfolio in order to achieve
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their target capital ratio in response to changes in the economic environment of
regulations. These changes might be an increase in capital requirements which
would bring a decrease in the Gap index.
For both consumer and commercial loans (which carry 50-100% weight in RWA)
growth, the e¤ect of gap is positive and signicant and it shows that as the gap
is increasing the bank increases its lending for individuals and commercial uses.
Specically, for an increase in gap by 1% it will increase the annual consumer and
commercial loans growth by 0.4 pp and 0.3 pp respectively in the short-run and
0.24 pp and 0.2 pp in the long-run. Real estate and Other assets (which carry
50-100% and 0-20% weight in RWA respectively) growth are negatively impacted
by the Gap. The coe¢ cient for the real estate and Other assets growth show that
for an increase in gap by 1% it will decrease the annual consumer and commercial
loans growth roughly by 0.2 pp and 0.3 pp respectively in the short-run and 0.1 pp
and 0.3 pp in the long-run. As I said before, the coe¢ cient for Interbank growth
is very small and insignicant. Even though, gap negatively a¤ects Other loans
(0.15 pp and 0.07 pp in short-run and long-run respectively) the value of Other
loans is a small fraction compared to the other loans and assets of the banks
loan portfolio. So, overall these results show that when the banks capital ratio
surplus increases(capital decit decreases) and become better capitalised(closer to
its target), they tend to reduce the amount of safer (according to RWA Basel II
weights) investments and increase the amount of riskier (and more protable) ones,
while decreasing their total capital and Tier 1.
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Table 4: Loans and Capital determinants (Short-run)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Commercial Consumer RealEstate Interbank OtherLoans OtherAssets Capital Tier 1
Lag Gap 0.0420*** 0.0254* -0.0170** 0.040 -0.0150*** -0.027** -0.158*** -0.0282***
(0.013) (0.0131) (0.0065) (0.0821) (0.00127) (0.0115) (0.0331) (0.007)
ΔProvisions -0.443** -0.966 -1.20 -3.99*** -4.19*** -1.15 -1.19* -0.16
(0.155) (0.899) (8.88) (0.290) (1.54) (6.78) (0.667) (0.27)
Charge_Off -0.609** -0.0958** -0.467*** -0.896*** -0.161 -0.0777 -0.0595 -0.461***
(0.0221) (0.0344) (0.141) (0.180) (0.126) (0.0190) (0.401) (0.105)
GDPG 0.412*** -0.0638** 0.00250 -0.926 1.023*** 0.216 -0.120 -0.53**
(0.013) (0.0275) (0.0229) (1.74) (0.144) (0.112) (0.235) (0.242)
L.Commercial -0.736***
(0.110)
L.Consumer -0.319***
(0.0424)
L.Real_Estate -0.676***
(0.156)
Lag Interbank -0.124***
(0.0397)
L.Other_Loans -1.119***
(0.0887)
L.Other_Assets 0.0133
(0.124)
L.Capital 0.116***
(0.0299)
L.Tier1 0.274***
(0.0381)
Constant -0.789* 2.886** 0.510*** -2.81 -2.359*** -0.652 2.361*** 0.366*
(0.439) (1.214) (0.08) (3.99) (0.313) (2.427) (0.719) (0.187)
Observations 148 126 96 162 108 120 137 158
No of Banks 15 13 13 15 14 13 15 15
Instruments 14 14 10 14 10 14 14 14
AR(1)(p-value) 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.023 0.069 0.148 0.074 0.034
AR(2)(p-value) 0.243 0.235 0.744 0.579 0.630 0.723 0.837 0.306
Sargan(p>chi2) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Hansen(p>chi2) 0.759 0.614 0.369 0.627 0.792 0.453 0.373 0.249
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The system GMM regression
estimates are reported of the short-run effects of Gap on asset growth as found in equation (8). In
columns (1)-(5) the dependent variables are the growth rates of the different types of loans at time t, in
column (6) the dependent variable is the growth rate of the other_assets = total assets- total loans at
time t, in columns (7) the dependent variable is the growth rate of the ratio of the total capital over the
risk weighted assets at time t and in column (8) the dependent variable is the growth rate of Tier 1
capital as a percentage of total risk weighed assets at time t. The p-value of the Hansen test of validity,
the p-value of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the p-value of the first-order
autocorrelation test (AR(1) and AR(2)) are reported. The p-value of the F stat of the equation is shown
in the last row.
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Table 5: Loans and Capital determinants (Long-run)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Commercial Consumer RealEstate Interbank OtherLoans OtherAssets Capital Tier 1
Lag Gap 0.0242*** 0.0193* -0.01** 0.0036 -0.0071*** -0.0276** -0.179*** -0.039***
(0.07) (0.01) (0.004) (0.07) (0.0006) (0.012) (0.0374) (0.01)
ΔProvisions -0.255** -0.73 -0.716 -3.55*** -1.97*** -1.17 -1.35* 0.22
(0.09) (0.68) (5.3) (0.26) (0.727) (6.87) (0.75) (0.37)
Charge_Off -0.351** -0.073** -0.278*** -0.79*** -0.0759 -0.079 -0.0673 -0.635***
(0.0127) (0.026) (0.084) (0.16) (0.06) (0.0193) (0.454) (0.145)
GDPG 0.237*** -0.048** 0.0015 -0.82 0.483*** 0.219 -0.136 -0.73**
(0.0075) (0.021) (0.017) (1.55) (0.068) (0.114) (0.266) (0.333)
Constant -0.455* 2.19** 0.3*** -2.5 -1.113*** -0.66 2.67*** 0.504*
(0.253) (0.92) (0.05) (3.55) (0.148) (2.459) (0.814) (0.258)
Observations 148 126 96 162 108 120 137 158
No of Banks 15 13 13 15 14 13 15 15
Instruments 14 14 10 14 10 14 14 14
AR(1)(pvalue) 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.023 0.069 0.148 0.047 0.034
AR(2) (pvalue) 0.243 0.235 0.744 0.579 0.630 0.723 0.837 0.306
Sargan(p>chi2) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Hansen(p>chi2) 0.759 0.614 0.369 0.627 0.792 0.453 0.373 0.249
Prof>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The system GMM regression
estimates are reported of the long-run effects of Gap on asset growth in equation (8). The results
presented here are the long-run transformation of the results shown in Table 4 by dividing the
coefficients of the explanatory variables by the adjustment speed of the dependent variable for each
column. The adjustment speed is calculated as 1-λ, where λ is the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable for each column. In columns (1)-(5) the dependent variables are the growth rates of the
different types of loans at time t, in column (6) the dependent variable is the growth rate of the
other_assets = total assets- total loans at time t, in columns (7) the dependent variable is the growth
rate of the ratio of the total capital over the risk weighted assets at time t and in column (8) the
dependent variable is the growth rate of Tier 1 capital as a percentage of total risk weighed assets at
time t. The p-value of the Hansen test of validity, the p-value of the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions and the p-value of the first-order autocorrelation test (AR(1) and AR(2)) are reported. The
p-value of the F stat of the equation is shown in the last row.
Despite the fact that provisions are signicant for some of the assets, its rela-
tively high coe¢ cient for almost all loans shows that it acts as a strong detergent
for loans growth expansion. The Charge o¤ is highly signicant for loans (except
Other loans) and it has the expected sign (negative). Lastly, the growth of GDP
has a positive impact on Commercial and Real Estate loans, which could poten-
tially imply that during an economic expansion the increase in the investment in
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the economy and a potential decrease in unemployment creates demand for these
types of loans which drives their supply as well. What needs to be mentioned here
is what looks like a counterintuitive sign of the GDP growth for the Consumer
loans (even though its value is very small). This does not suggest that an increase
in the growth of GDP would decrease the supply of Consumer loans. Given that
we are dealing with growth rates for all the dependent variables, it means that an
increase in the GDP growth will slow down the growth rate of Consumer loans.
Since commercial loans are risky and in many cases unsecured (e.g. credit cards),
during a growth period the banks might want to slow down the growth of their
risky side of the portfolio. Thus, a potential explanation is that it might be a
representation of prudential behaviour.
Finally, there is a strong impact of the capital surplus and the Capital and Tier
1 growth which is negative and highly signicant as expected and in line with the
literature. As the banks capital ratio moves away from its target the banks tend
to reduce the growth of the total capital and tier 1 capital that they hold. The
percentage by which they do that is 0.16 pp and 0.02 pp for total capital and tier
1 capital respectively in the short-run and 0.18 pp and 0.03 pp in the long-run
for every 1% increase in capital surpluses. This result means that as a respond
to a change in policy (increase in capital requirements) the percentage increase
of the total capital will be more than the one of the high quality Tier 1 capital
justied by its greater cost to raise. I nd some evidence of a negative relationship
between capital ratios and the economic cycle over recent years, consistent with
previous literature (de-Ramon (2016)), indicate their countercyclical nature. This
combined with the positive relationship found in the literature between capital
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requirements and capital surplus give rise to potential procyclicality of the capital
requirements which requires the attention of the policymakers when setting them.
In Table 6, I examine if the e¤ect of Gap is di¤erent in the during and post-crisis
period compared to the pre-crisis period using the specication found in Equation
9. By looking at the interaction term about the period during the nancial crisis
(Lag Gap*Dcr) we nd that it is signicant and higher than the pre-crisis period
for the loans (apart from the Interbank loans) and other assets but not statistically
signicant for the capital and Tier 1 variables. This means that during the crisis
the banks focused on changing their loan portfolio to adjust to the regulators will
and not the capital and Tier 1 ratios. It can be explained by the fact that capital,
especially during a nancial crisis, is very expensive and di¢ cult to raise so the
banks had to meet their capital requirements by adjusting their loan portfolio more
intensely than before the crisis.
On the other hand, the interaction term about the post-crisis period (Lag
Gap*Dcr) is statistically signicant for the Capital, Tier 1 and other assets vari-
ables but not for the loans (apart from the very small in value other loans). This
says that the banks continued to adjust their loan portfolio similarly as they were
doing before the crisis but they greatly intensied (especially for Tier 1 which is the
most loss absorbent capital type) their adjustment procedure for their capital by
increasing even more their capital ratio (both total and Tier 1) with an increase in
capital requirements compared to the pre-crisis period. This enhances the notion
that the UK banks became better capitalised after the crisis, especially after the
QE from the Bank of England and the announcement of the Basel III new capital
requirements and regulations.
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Table 6: Loans and Capital determinants during and after crisis (Long-run)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Commercial Consumer RealEstate Interbank OtherLoans OtherAssets Capital Tier 1
Lag Gap 0.032*** 0.025* -0.008** 0.0045 -0.0085*** -0.02** -0.158*** -0.056***
(0.09) (0.015) (0.004) (0.08) (0.0009) (0.014) (0.039) (0.011)
Lag Gap*Dcr 0.05** 0.033* -0.011** -0.03 -0.005** -0.01* -0.092 0.00
(0.013) (0.027) (0.005) (0.03) (0.002) (0.008) (0.073) (0.012)
Lag Gap*Dpost 0.01 0.012 0.003 0.041 0.011** -0.01** -0.21*** -0.148***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.006) (0.062) (0.004) (0.004) (0.06) (0.05)
ΔProvisions -0.3** -1.22 -0.944 -3.55*** -1.97*** -1.17 -1.35* 0.22
(0.07) (1.18) (4.6) (0.26) (0.727) (6.87) (0.75) (0.37)
Charge_Off -0.402** -0.068** -0.307*** -0.69*** -0.109 -0.054 -0.081 -0.722***
(0.0174) (0.029) (0.091) (0.15) (0.16) (0.021) (0.49) (0.159)
GDPG 0.301*** -0.032** 0.0025* -0.65 0.392*** 0.177 -0.174 -0.98**
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (1.4) (0.092) (0.199) (0.308) (0.398)
Dcr 0.237* -0.048* 0.0015 -0.82 0.483* 0.219 -0.136 -0.7
(0.0075) (0.021) (0.017) (1.55) (0.068) (0.114) (0.266) (0.333)
Dpost 0.237* -0.048* 0.0015 -0.82 0.483* 0.219** -0.136 -0.73
(0.0075) (0.021) (0.017) (1.55) (0.068) (0.114) (0.266) (0.333)
Constant -0.24* 1.79** 0.14** -1.11 -2.02** -0.41 4.55*** 0.177*
(0.15) (0.61) (0.04) (1.83) (0.8) (1.65) (1.1) (0.09)
Observations 148 126 96 162 108 120 137 158
No of Banks 15 13 13 15 14 13 15 15
Instruments 18 18 14 18 14 18 18 18
AR(1)(pvalue) 0.006 0.006 0.013 0.035 0.088 0.11 0.04 0.022
AR(2) (pvalue) 0.37 0.43 0.673 0.63 0.51 0.881 0.69 0.391
Sargan(p>chi2) 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.04 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Hansen(p>chi2) 0.65 0.488 0.26 0.55 0.711 0.62 0.325 0.3
Prof>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The system GMM regression estimates
are reported of the short-run effects of Gap on asset growth in equation (8). In columns (1)-(5) the
dependent variables are the growth rates of the different types of loans at time t, in column (6) the
dependent variable is the growth rate of the other_assets = total assets- total loans at time t, in columns
(7) the dependent variable is the growth rate of the ratio of the total capital over the risk weighted assets
at time t and in column (8) the dependent variable is the growth rate of Tier 1 capital as a percentage
of total risk weighed assets at time t. Dcr is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the financial
crisis period 2007<t<2010 and 0 otherwise. Dpost is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the
period after the financial crisis t>2009 and 0 otherwise. The p-value of the Hansen test of validity, the
p-value of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the p-value of the first order autocorrelation
test (AR(1) and AR(2)) are reported. The p-value of the F stat of the equation is shown in the last row.
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4.2.1 Policy implications
The above results can also be used to explain what would have happened if there
was an increase in capital requirements. Since this would bring a decrease in the
Gap the bank would increase its real estate loans and decrease the consumer and
commercial ones. This needs to be examined further and deeper to understand
what are the implications. Even though they might appear moderate in size,
they show the banks response and its (and more importantly the regulators)
underestimation of the underlying risks associated with such behaviour. Despite
the fact that, following the Basel II risk weights denitions, the bank is making
the right choice, if an economic crisis hits the economy (e.g. housing bubble) then
the losses from the real estate loans would be more signicant than the ones from
the consumer and commercial loans.
Initially, same for all loans, because of the crisis there would be some borrowers
who would not be able to pay their debt and default, leaving the bank with losses.
The masked, additional risk, of the theoretically safer mortgage loans is that in
a period of crisis the real estate market is su¤ering as well. Combined with the
fact that, in many cases the loans are given to buy properties and commercial
buildings which are then used as collateral, the banks will su¤er an extra loss
because of the decreased real estate prices. This suggests that when the banks
respond to an increase in capital requirements, they increase their total capital
level and (probably) decrease their total loans however for their actual level of
riskiness it is ambiguous whether it goes up (in line with the results in Chapter
2) or down. This phenomenon was witnessed in the 2007-2009 nancial crisis and
it demands for more sophisticated measures for the risk weighted assets from the
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regulators and Basel III is heading toward this direction.
Finally, by examining the change in the e¤ect of Gap on loans and capital
growth in the before, during and after the crisis periods I nd that in the after
crisis period greatly increased their growth rate of Tier 1 capital in response to an
increase in capital requirements. This suggests that policies designed to encourage
banks to increase their capital ratios by enriching them with higher quality and
higher loss absorbance capability have been e¤ective, since in the post-crisis period
banks placed more emphasis on adjusting capital ratios by raising better-quality,
tier 1 capital together rather than focusing, as much on changing their balance
sheet risk.
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5 Conclusion
In this chapter I examine the e¤ects of bank capitalisation of di¤erent types of
banks loans, assets and capital growth for the UK commercial banks during 1999-
2016. I rst estimate the banks internal target for capital ratio following a partial
adjustment method widely spread in the literature. From this estimation I nd
that the commercial banks in the UK will need on average roughly 2.5 years
to adjust their capital ratios to their target ratios. The larger banks with easier
access to funding and better diversied portfolio hold smaller capital bu¤ers. Also,
the banks with a high share of better quality Tier 1 tend to increase their overall
capital ratio in order to avoid the costs of topping up rapidly their capital ratio
in case of a negative shock or a regulatory change. I then calculate a measure
of capital surplus/decit (Gap index) which is the distance between the actual
capital ratio and the desired one. Figure 2 shows that the worse capitalised banks
su¤ered a signicant drop in their Gap index at the start of the nancial crisis and
they had to extensively adjust their portfolio and/or capital in order to manage
to reach their pre-crisis levels of capitalisation (Gap index). At the same time the
better capitalised banks managed to maintain their reach their pre-crisis capital
surplus a lot quicker.
I then use this Gap index to examine its impact on the di¤erent types of bank
loansgrowth (Commercial, Consumer, Rear estate, Interbank, Other loans and
Other assets) and on their capitals growth (Total regulatory capital and Tier 1).
I nd that when the Gap increases, banks increase their lending for the loans
with the higher weight in the RWA (Commercial and Consumer) and decrease
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their credit supply of the ones with the lower weight (Real estate, Other assets).
This way they increase their risk weighted assets which is lowering their capital
ratio. At the same time, the Gap increase brings a fall in the growth of both
total and Tier 1 capital growth, reducing further their capital ratio. However,
the underlying risk of the mortgage loans, especially during an economic crisis,
leaves the e¤ect on the banks actual risk level ambiguous. The e¤ect of Gap on
assets and capital growth has also examined before, during and after the crisis
to highlight any di¤erences in the banks approach. I nd that during the crisis
they adjust their loan portfolio to maintain their risk weighted capital ratio and
follow the regulatory instructions, while in the post-crisis period it is the capital
(both total and Tier1) that is substantially adjusted in response to Gap changes. It
shows the capitals (especially Tier 1) nature during a nancial crisis as it becomes
more costly to raise and more scarce.
Furthermore, the economic upturn proxied by the GDP growth has a negative
e¤ect on capital growth and positive on loans. This means that during an eco-
nomic downturn the banks will decrease their earning by limiting credit supply
and increase their costs by rapidly raising capital. This brings up the possibility
for the procyclicality e¤ects of capital requirements since in times of economic
turbulence regulators tend to intervene and increase them, adding hurdles to the
banks survival. On the other hand reducing them during an economic crisis would
be damaging for their stability. Also, combined with the issue raised earlier about
the insu¢ cient measures for the risk weighted assets missing the underlying risks
involved with mortgage loans creates an important issue. The only solution is to
supervise the bankss risk management during the less distressed times and make
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sure that the amount of capital ratio they hold accounts for the true (as much as
possible) level of their risk. The regulators seem to be aware of this issue since
the Basel III introduces a series of higher countercyclical capital ratios in its lat-
est package reforms. Moreover Provisions for loan losses and Chagre-o¤s act as a
deterrent for loans growth.
The focus of this chapter has been lending to various sectors of the economy and
for this reason only commercial banks have been considered. After further restric-
tions to the sample with criteria about the size of their activities, the availability of
data for long periods and whether their focus has been to domestic lending leaves
only 16 commercial banks which also limited the estimation techniquesoptions.
This means that the results, even though in their majority are in line with the
literature, from this chapter must be used with caution when making generalisa-
tions about the banking industry. A nal note on this work is that the models I
have used, unlike the portfolio theory models, do not examine if the results are
consistent with the long-run portfolio theory. Normally in a portfolio theory, even
when your desired and the actual position are not the same, the balance sheet
constraints must hold at all times and in the long-run each asset might have a
di¤erent share of the portfolio but their growth rates should be the same as the
portfolios. Otherwise, the assets with the highest growth rate will dominate over
the rest. This point is also valid for the rest of the literature that I am following
and can be considered as something for future research.
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6 Appendix
GMM estimator
As summarised by Roodman (2007), the GMM estimators are general estima-
tors designed for panels with a small number of time periods and a large number
of individuals. The specication of the model needs to be a dynamic linear model,
the independent variables can be correlated withe the past and current values
of the error term (i.e. endogenous). This method also allows the inclusion of
xed individual e¤ects and the existence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
within individuals but not across them. Lastly, it assumes that the only available
instruments are the lags of the instrumented variables which are assumed to be
uncorrelated with the xed e¤ects which increases e¢ ciency. The GMM estimator
is not only e¢ cient but also consistent, meaning that under appropriate conditions
it converges in probability to  as sample size reaches innity (Hansen 1982). The
work of Arellano & Bond(1991) who created the Di¤erence GMM combined with
the work by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond(1998) who augment
the estimator by adding the e¢ ciency assumption bring the system GMM estima-
tor. It is a linear GMM estimator in a system containing both rst-di¤erenced
and levels equations. The following derivation of the estimation is shown as found
in Roodman (2007). The model that needs to be tted is:
y = x0 + 
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E [jz] = 0
where  is a vector of coe¢ cients, y and  are random variables, x = [x1:::xk]0
is a column vector of k regressors, z = [z1:::zj]0 is a column vector of j instruments
and x and z may share elements, and j  k. He uses X, Y, and Z to represent
matrices of N observations for x, y, and z, and dene E = Y  X. The empirical
residuals for an estimate ^ are E^ = [e^1:::e^N ]0 = Y  X^. For a vector of empirical
moments EN [z]  1NZ 0E^, if a matrix A is a generalized metric, based on a positive
semi-denite quadratic form then it is:
k EN [z] kA=k 1
N
Z 0E^ kA N( 1
N
Z 0E^)0A(
1
N
Z 0E^) =
1
N
E^ 0ZAZ 0E^
To derive the implied GMM estimator ^A he solves the minimization problem
^A = arg min^ which results in the GMM estimator:
^A = (X
0ZAZ 0X) 1X 0ZAZ 0Y
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Chapter 4
Banking competition and stability:
evidence from Western advanced economies
90
Abstract
The recent nancial crisis highlighted the importance of the nancial sec-
tor and one of the factors that researchers have particularly examined
that inuences stability is the level of competition in the banking in-
dustry. This chapter examines this relationship for Western advanced
economies during 2002-2011, using aggregated data on the country level
to better examine the industrys overall risk rather than the individual.
I nd evidence to support the competition-stability theory when using
the Boone indicator and the competition-fragility theory when using the
Lerner index and the HHI index showing that di¤erent measures of com-
petition capture di¤erent aspects of it. Also, I document an increased
benet from the present of stronger and more stringent regulation and
supervision in the less competitive markets.
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1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis highlighted the importance of the nancial sec-
tor and how fragile it can be without the appropriate supervision and
regulatory framework. One of the factors that researchers have particu-
larly examined that inuences stability is the level of competition in the
banking industry. The competition in the nancial sector o¤ers low cost
of borrowing which is translated in increased investments, easier access
to nancial services and more innovation which overall improve welfare
economic growth. Its impact on nancial stability has attracted great
interest over the years from both policymakers and academics. However
it still remains unanswered with opposing theoretical and empirical re-
sults. The di¢ culty of nding widely accepted and accurate measures for
competition (and stability) have led to case-dependent results based on
the measures the are used and their choice of countries.
On the one hand, there is the "competition-fragility" theory that more
competition among banks leads to more fragility. Following from the the-
oretical models by Marcus (1984) and Keeley (1990), the idea behind it is
that as competition decreases the banks franchise value and prot mar-
gins are reduced to the point that they will seek more protable and riskier
assets and activities to invest in. On the other hand, the "competiton-
stability" view has been introduced primarily by Boyd and De Nicolo
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(2005) and Boyd et al. (2006) who followed Stiglitz and Weisss (1981)
model. It explains that in more competitive banking systems where inter-
est rates are low the consumers nd it easier to repay their debt limiting
the banks losses and probability of default. However, in the more recent
literature(e.g. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), Hakenes and Schnabel
(2011)) show that the relationship between competition and risk is non-
linear(they nd that it is more U-shaped). This means that for some levels
competition can be benecial for the nancial stability and for others it
has unfavourable results.
This chapter contributes to this literature as I attempt to shed more
light on the competition stability nexus by using aggregated data at the
country level to o¤er a di¤erent view of the overall stability of the banking
system rather than the individual banks. I use two di¤erent competition
measures (Lerner, Boone), for a period (2002-1011) that includes the -
nancial crisis for the European Union(which has only being examined
briey in the literature using these measures) and four more Western ad-
vanced economies (USA,Canada, Switzerland and Norway). The Lerner
index shows evidence in favour of the competition-fragility approach.
Specically, higher market power leads to greater stability when control-
ling for macroeconomic, Banking sector-specic and regulatory variables.
The opposite result is derived by the Boone indicator which supports the
idea that di¤erent competition measures capture di¤erent aspects of the
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competition and correlate di¤erently with the stability measures even in
the same sample ( Liu et al. (2012), Kick and Prieto (2015)). This shows
that di¤erent measures capture a di¤erent aspect of competition and can
provide di¤erent results which is one of the reasons why the literature has
not given a clear answer yet.
I also examine the e¤ect of regulation on this competition stability
nexus by adding interaction terms of the regulatory variables and the com-
petition measures. I nd evidence that the benet in stability from higher
supervisory power and more stringent activity restrictions is greater in a
less competitive banking industry, since a strong supervisory presence is
necessary in these markets. For robustness tests I, rst, use a concen-
tration measure(HHI index) as a proxy for competition which supports
the competition-fragility view also found by the Lerner index. Secondly,
I examine whether the non-linearity specication is present in my sample
including the squared version of the competition measure that I am using
in each model, however the results do not support this.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The relevant the-
oretical and empirical literature is summarised in Section two. The data
and methodology used to analyse the relationship between competition
and stability are presented in Section three. The results from the analysis
are reported and explained in Section four. Section ve concludes.
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2 Literature review
After the current nancial crisis began, politicians and regulators in the
U.S. stated that the low level of competition in the banking sector may
have been a signicant factor in the crisis and the recovery of the indus-
try. I focus on Western advanced and developing economies which were
a¤ected by the crisis (i.e. EU, USA, Canada, Switzerland and Norway)
and the studies about them show that, depending on the method and
competition measures used, the banking industry can be described as a
monopolistic competition. In some cases it can even have an oligopolis-
tic structure. What has been shown is that greater competition in the
banking sector could lead to lower costs, greater innovation, e¢ ciency and
improvement of the quality of nancial services. According to Bikker and
Spierdijk (2008), who examined the development of bank competition in
the Euro Area, there has been a decrease in bank competition up to the
years of the crisis. They explain that is the outcome of the increase in con-
centration, bank size and o¤-balance sheet activities. The concentration
and the bankssize in the banking sectors of the EU countries continued
to increase even during the crisis period.
It has been established that the banking sectors of all EU countries
are not homogeneous, however there are similarities within the EU-15 and
EU-12 groups. According to Weill (2013), the direction of the changes in
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competition between banks within EU-15 countries are ambiguous. For
the EU-12 group Pawlowska (2012) and Efthyvoulou and Yildrim (2013)
provide evidence of increase in competition before the crisis and a less
signicant decrease during the crisis. Between EU-15 and EU-12 countries
there has been a convergence in competition before the crisis.
There is a substantial literature on the relationship between compe-
tition in the banking sector and the nancial stability of that country.
There is still no academic consensus on whether competition is also re-
sponsible for the greater fragility, with conicted theoretical predictions
and mixed empirical results. The evidence also points to a complex rela-
tionship between concentration and stability. Based on the theoretical and
the empirical literature changes and di¤erences in market structures and
competition and their e¤ects on stability are very much case-dependent.
As it is presented by Allen and Gale (2000, 2004) di¤erent models can
provide di¤erent results regarding the trade-o¤between banking competi-
tion and stability. They nd similarly mixed results about the relationship
between risk and the competition level of the market.
2.1 Theoretical literature
As stated before, what comes out of the literature is that the impact
of competition on bank risk is ambiguous in both the theoretical and the
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empirical literature. On the one hand, enhanced competition could lead to
excessive risk-taking by banks (Keeley (1990), Repullo (2004) and Jimenez
and Lopez, (2007)). They nd, using US data, that increased banking
competition combined with deregulation that took place in the US during
the 1990s decreased monopoly rents and contributed to bank failures. As
explained by Hellman et al. (2000) the increased competition reduces
market power which, along with limited liability and the application of at
rate deposit insurance, potentially leads to a more risk-taking behaviour
from the banks. Boot and Thakor (1993) and Allen and Gale (2000)
argue that in a more competitive environment, since banks earn lower
rents, they also reduce their incentives for monitoring.
When using concentration to proxy competition there are reasons to
support that competition leads to greater fragility. One characteristic of
large banks is that they can diversify better so that banking systems dom-
inated with a few large banks are likely to be more stable than banking
systems with a large number of small banks (Allen and Gale, 2004). On
top of that, it is argued that a few large banks are easier to monitor and
supervise compared to competitive banking systems with a large number
of small banks. This theory represents the "charter value" idea.
On the front of the relationship between competition and risk-taking
behavior from the banks Boyd and De Niccoló (2005) argue that the above
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theory ignores the e¤ect of bank competition on borrowersbehavior and
for that reason it is fragile. Boyd and De Niccoló (2005) explain that as
concentration increases, banksmarket power also increases which they
use to charge higher loan rates. Stiglitz andWeiss (1981) show that higher
loan rates increase the probability of bankruptcy for borrowers, who in
turn will need to take on riskier projects to avoid it. This will make
the nancial system less stable and increase the probability of a nancial
crisis.
Moreover, in contrast to the argument that higher concentration will
bring more stability, Kane (1989) and Anginer and Warburton (2011), ar-
gue that "too-big-to-fail" banks, because of the promise for help in di¢ cult
times from the government, have di¤erent risk taking incentives which can
destabilize the nancial system. In addition, Johnson and Kwak (2010)
support that very large banks can be very di¢ cult to supervise given their
complexity, and their ability to politically capture their supervisors which
can lead to systemic risk. Finally, this school of thought recognizes that
the rst theory might be correct in countries with generous safety nets
and weak supervision.
Moving onto the relationship between risk and competition we nd
that the realisation of risk is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon
and there are certain studies that use a number of di¤erent risk indica-
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tors to gauge the level of distress that banks experienced which can be
either systemic risk or banks individual risk. A large part of the litera-
ture has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute
level of risk of individual banks. Anginer et al. (2012) in their analysis,
though, examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks,
hence systemic risk and they nd that greater competition encourages
banks to take on more diversied risks, making the banking system less
fragile to shocks. Theories based on the idea of charter valueargue that
market power mitigates bank risk taking, since foregone future prots in
the case of bankruptcy are higher. However, more recent theories suggest
that stronger competition does not necessarily worsen stability. As re-
gards bank liability side risk, it argues that coordination problems among
depositors causing bank fragility can emerge independently of competi-
tion. On the asset side risk, it argues that there can be cases in which a
concentrated banking sector would be riskier than a competitive sector.
2.2 Empirical literature
As summarized in the ECB paper by Carletti and Hartmann (2002) in
the empirical literature, one can distinguish four types of studies: the
rst type regresses measures of bank risk on measures of bank market
power, the second group of papers assesses the potential diversication
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or risk reduction e¤ects of combining di¤erent businesses in a merger
or increasing bank size in other ways, the third type measures changes
in bank stock return correlations as an indicator of the implications of
consolidation for systemic risk and the fourth type discusses the relative
e¢ ciency and risk in bank sectors of di¤erent countries that are more or
less competitive. The most common measures used for competition are
the concentration, Lerner index and the H-statistic and for the stability
the Zscore (all are explained in the data and methodology section) and
the NPLs (Non-Performing Loans).
In the empirical literature we nd evidence from studies which support
the inuential charter-value hypothesis and from others that support
the competition-stability view. As it has been stated earlier, the results
on the trade-o¤ between competition and stability from the empirical
literature are inconclusive and depend on the di¤erent measures used for
competition and stability, the method, the number of countries chosen
and on whether the dataset used has bank-level or aggregate data. Most
of the studies, until recently, either focus on one country or if they use
panel data they use bank-level data and focus on the individual risk rather
than the systemic risk. Specically, Anginer et al. (2012), that it is better
to use country-level data instead of bank-level data to examine systemic
risk rather than individual bank risk.
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Early studies like Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) and Gal-
loway et al. (1997) nd results which support Keeleys (1990) theory
about the charter value. Jiménez et al. (2007a) examine the e¤ect of
banking competition on bank risk-taking in Spain for the period 1988-
2003. As a measure of bank risk-taking and nancial stability, they use
NPLs and the Lerner index is used for competition as well as HHI. They
show that the HHI does not a¤ect NPLs and that competition is nega-
tively related to the banks risk, implying that greater market power is
associated with lower level of NPLs.
When concentration is found to be endogenous then more concentrated
systems tend to have larger and better-diversied banks. Beck et al.
(2006) in a cross-country study, using data for 69 countries for the period
l980-1997, show that systemic crises are less likely in concentrated banking
systems and that fewer regulatory restrictions are associated with less
systemic fragility. Similarly, Berger et al. (2009) in a cross-country study
of 23 developed nations show that market power increases loan portfolio
risk of banks but decreases overall risk because banks with market power
hold more equity capital. Schenk et al. (2009) using the Panzar-Rosse
H-statistic to proxy for competition with data for 45 countries between
1980 and 2005 nd that concentration itself is associated with a higher
probability of a crisis. Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013) using the
Lerner index nd a negative relation between competition and stability,
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but show that the strength of the relation varies across countries based
on country level institutions. This result is similar to the one derived in
this chapter as well.
In favour of the alternative hypothesis which states that more com-
petition brings more stability we have De Nicoló, Bartholomew, Zaman,
and Zephirin (2004) who nd that countries with more concentrated bank-
ing systems show higher levels of risk-taking. This is also conrmed by
Houston, Lin and Ma (2010) who use the Herndahl index to proxy for
competition. Barth, Lin, and Song (2009) nd the same result through a
di¤erent channel. They show that bank competition reduces corruption
in bank lending, which can improve bank stability. Using the ability of
banks to pass on cost increases as a measure of competition, Schaeck, Ci-
hak, andWolfe (2009) also nd that more competition reduces risk-taking.
They nd that countries with more competitive banking systems are less
likely to experience a nancial crisis. Consistent with the lending rate
channel in Boyd and De Nicoló (2005), Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006)
nd that after banks merge, they charge higher interest rates. Boyd, De
Nicoló, and Jalal (2009, 2010) nd that when bank competition is higher,
the bankruptcy risk of the bank is lower, borrower risk is lower, and the
loan-to-asset ratio is higher.
There are fewer studies which use aggregate data, however because of
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recent datasets like the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD)
their number is rising. For example, in Uhde and Heimesho¤ (2009) they
examine the e¤ect of banking concentration on nancial stability for the
period 1997-2005 for the EU-25 countries. It is the rst study investigat-
ing this relationship using panel data analysis for EU countries. Zscore is
the proxy for nancial stability. Their results show a negative relationship
between concentration and stability. Anginer et al. (2012) investigate the
link between competition and risk-taking behaviour of banks. They ob-
tain a sample of publicly traded banks from 63 countries for the period
1997-2009. They focus on systemic risk rather than individual bank risk,
in order to address macro-prudential policy issues. Hence, they do not
use bank-level data. Instead of the Zscore, an alternative measure is used
to address potential spurious correlation between the Lerner Index and
Zscore, since both are calculated using protability measures. The results
presented show that higher competition leads banks to a higher level of
risk diversication and hence, to greater stability.
Finally, in recent years, because of the changes in regulations after the
crisis in Europe and of the availability of better datasets there has been an
increasing interest for the e¤ect of regulation on competition and stability.
Agoraki et al. (2011) conduct a country-level analysis and for compari-
son use a panel dataset for 546 banks in 13 countries as well. They nd
similar results for both approaches using both NPLs and Zscore to proxy
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stability and the Lerner Index for competition. The important addition is
the one of regulatory variables like capital stringency, supervisory power
and restrictions in activities. Results show a negative signicant rela-
tionship between market power and NPLs. When capital requirements
are combined with market power, risk-taking is lower. O¢ cial supervi-
sory power is the only mechanism to reduce directly risk. Lastly, in their
analysis Anginer et al. (2012) also examine the impact of the institutional
and regulatory environment on systemic stability and show that banking
systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private
monitoring, high government ownership of banks, and in countries with
public policies that restrict competition.
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In the empirical literature there have been a large number of measures
for banking stability as well as for competition in the banking industry.
An even larger number of explanatory and control variable has been used
in more or less complex mixes. All the above combined with the vari-
ous econometric methodologies that the researchers have used have given
mixed results and this is one of the reasons why the competition-stability
relationship still remains a puzzle. For my research in my regression
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model I use a mixture of signicant explanatory variables based on pre-
vious studies using equally well established regression techniques.
3.1 Data description and Sources
My dataset includes the 28 EU countries and two more European ad-
vanced countries which have very similar characteristics Switzerland and
Norway and another two Western advanced economies which experienced
the nancial crisis in a similar way to the EU countries, namely the USA
and Canada. The data I am using are annual and aggregated on the
country level to give a di¤erent view of the competition stability rela-
tionship. According to Anginer et al. (2012), when a research aims to
assess systemic risk rather than individual bank risk, it is better to use
country-level data instead of bank-level data. Moreover, a cross-country
analysis is the best approach to address macro-prudential policy issues
and facilitate in measuring the impact of institutional and regulatory en-
vironment. I use various data sources to construct my sample, specically
the updated World Bank 2013 series, the Global Financial Development
Database (GFDD), the World Banks Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI), the World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) and
the OECD European Commissions AMECO database. My dataset cov-
ers the period 2002-2011 based on the availability of data from the BRSS.
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The aforementioned database is unique as it allows us to quantify the level
and the quality of regulation and supervision in a country. It is developed
by Barth, Caprio and Levine in 2000 (and then updated in 2003, 2005,
2008 and 2011) and includes regulation and supervision data of banks
in over 100 countries. They created it based on surveys sent to national
bank regulatory and supervisory authorities around the world.
3.1.1 Stability measure
Market-based indicators can be calculated for listed banks and may in-
clude volatility of stock returns as a proxy of total risk or indicators of
systematic or idiosyncratic risk. Accounting based indicators may include
the Zscore, di¤erent credit risk indicators (e.g. provisions over total loans,
loan loss reserves over loans, impairments to loans, non-performing loans
to loans), solvency risk indicators (e.g. equity to total assets, equity to
risk-weighted assets), or asset risk (risk-weighted assets to assets). As Zs-
core captures the overall risk of a bank, it is used as the main risk-taking
indicator in this analysis. More specically, I am using the aggregated
Zscore to capture systemic risk potential in banking which can be mea-
sured by joint risk-taking of systemically important banks (De Nicoló,
Bartholomew, Zaman, and Zephirin, 2004). Consequently, aggregate Zs-
core can be used as a proxy for systemic risk potential. This indicator
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was introduced by Boyd and Graham (1988) who Built on work by Roy
(1952) and has been thereafter used in numerous empirical papers (e.g.,
Boyd et al., 2006; Agoraki et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2013; Samantas, 2013;
Schaeck and Cihák, 2014). This Zscore should not be confused with the
Altman (1968) Zscore measure, which is a set of nancial and economic
ratios and it is used to predict corporate nance distress.
Its widespread use is due to its relative simplicity in computation and
the fact that it can be computed using publicly available accounting data
only. The basic principle of the Zscore measure is to relate a banks capital
level to variability in its returns, so that one can know how much vari-
ability in returns can be absorbed by capital without the bank becoming
insolvent. The variability in returns is typically measured by the standard
deviation of Return on Assets (ROA) as the denominator of Zscore, while
the numerator of the ratio is typically dened as the ratio of equity capital
to assets plus ROA (on the assumption that those will be available to sup-
port the bank remaining in business, or in the case of loss, to adjust the
capital level downwards). The assumption is made that a bank becomes
insolvent when its capital level falls to zero. Although this assumption is
not realistic in practice, as banks need a positive minimum level of capi-
tal, there is another potential line of research to identify a minimum level
of capital below which a bank cannot operate. Another criticism reported
in the literature (e.g. Anginer et al., 2012) spurious correlation might be
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present between Lerner and Zscore since they are both using protability
measures to be calculated. This is way I use two more competition mea-
sures, to draw safer conclusions about its impact on stability. Lastly, the
Zscore is a backward looking measure so it cannot express the markets
expectation of a banks stability in the future. The distance-to-default
(developed by Merton, 1974) measure is forward looking, measuring the
di¤erence between the asset value of the bank and the face value of its
debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the banks asset value. How-
ever, it is not available from the GFDD database and the latter does not
provide a list of the banks it used to calculate the explanatory variables
that I used from it so that I can calculate its aggregated value using the
same group of banks.
To approximate the probability that a countrys banking system de-
faults I use the most commonly used Zscore, found in Boyd et al. (2006)
which is calculated as:
Zit =
[ROAit + (E=TA)it]
(ROAit)
where ROAit is the rate of return on assets, E=TAit is the ratio of
equity to assets, and ROAit is an estimate of the standard deviation of
the rate of return on assets. The Zscore indicates with how many stan-
dard deviations prots can fall before capital is depleted, so it is the in-
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verse of the probability of insolvency (Lepetit and Strobel, 2015). Thus,
a higher Zscore indicates that the bank is more stable. As dened in
the GFDD dataset the indicator compares the systems bu¤ers (returns
and capitalization) with the systems riskiness (volatility of returns). Re-
turn of Assets (ROA), equity, and assets are country-level aggregate g-
ures (calculated from underlying bank-by-bank unconsolidated data from
Bankscope). To avoid time invariance of the denominator, the standard
deviation of ROA is estimated as a 5-year moving average so as to po-
tentially attribute the variation of the Zscore not only to the variation
of protability and capital, but also to the volatility of bank protabil-
ity. Additionally, with time the banks risk prole may change, and so
do bank strategy and bank lending pattern. As Zscore is highly skewed,
Laeven and Levine (2009) propose to use its natural logarithm (lnZscore),
which is normally distributed.
3.1.2 Competition measures
Two of the most frequently used measures for banking competition in the
literature are the Lerner index and the H-statistic from the Panzar-Rosse
model (1987). The latter assumes long run equilibrium which is unlikely
in the case of the crisis period and for this reason I am not using it. My
main measure of banking competition is the Lerner index, which shows
109
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY Chapter 4
market power in banking taking into account the competitive behaviour
of banks. Higher Lerner Index implies greater market power which means
less competition in the banking industry. In theWorld Banks 2013 Global
Financial Development Database (GFDD) they use bank-level data to
calculate the Lerner Index and then they aggregate on the country level
to reect the market power in a countrys banking sector. The Lerner
index is give by the following:
L =
P  MC
P
where P is the market price set by the bank and MC is its marginal
cost.
As a second proxy for the degree of banking competition in the bank-
ing sector, which we use for robustness check, we use the Boone (2008)
indicator. It is calculated by estimating elasticity of prots and dividing
it by marginal costs. Elasticity of prots is estimated by regressing log
of return-on-assets on the log of marginal costs. The Boone Indicator is
based on the theory that in the more competitive environment the more
e¢ cient banks enjoy higher prots. This can be seen in a version of the
Boone indicator as found in Leuvensteijn et al. (2007):
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ln Si =  + lnmci
where Si is the banks market share and mci is the banks marginal
cost. Since the market shares of banks with lower marginal costs are
expected to increase, so that  is negative. The stronger competition is,
the stronger this e¤ect will be, and the larger, in absolute terms, this
(negative) value of  which is the Boone indicator. This implies that a
more negative Boone Indicator indicates a higher degree of competition
because the reallocation of prots e¤ect is greater.
The last measure used for robustness tests in theHerndahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) which is a measure of market concentration. It is calculated
by squaring the market share of each bank as shown below:
HHI =
IX
i=1
(
Depositsci
Depositsc
)2
where c is for each country and i is for each bank. Deposits is the
total deposits amount of deposits held by all banks in the country c and
I is the total number of banks in that country c. The higher the HHI
index is the more concentrated the industry is and its values go from 0 to
1. The data for all three variables comes from the GFDD database.
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3.1.3 Macroeconomic variables
Following the literature I use as a measure of economic development the
natural logarithm of GDP per capita measured in constant 2005 US dol-
lars from the World Development Indicators (WDI). To control for the
business cycle I use the GDP growth % from the World Development In-
dicators (WDI) which is calculated based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars
following Jimenez et al. (2013) and Olivero et al. (2010). Another fre-
quently used macroeconomic variable is the interest-rate which is included
to control for the monetary environment and it is associated with banks
protability (Agoraki et al., 2011). I use the short term real interest rate
from the OECD European Commissions AMECO database calculated
using the nominal short term interest rate divided by the GDP deator.
Finally, I use the unemployment rate which will a¤ect the level of banking
risk as it will a¤ect the borrowersincome and ability to repay their loans.
The data are drawn from the OECD European Commissions AMECO
database.
3.1.4 Banking sector-specic variables
As a proxy for moral hazard following Schaeck and Cihak (2008) and
Berger et al. (2009) I use the Bank Capital to total assets (%) variable.
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Capital accounts for the tier 1 capital, other reserves and regulatory capi-
tal of a banking sector and it is divided by total nancial and non-nancial
assets. I also include Net interest income to total income (%) to control
for diversication opportunities, where total income includes net-interest
income and non-interest income. I also use Net interest margin (%) which
is banks net interest revenue as a share of its average interest-bearing to-
tal assets to control for protability. Finally, I use the Cost-to-income
ratio (%) as a proxy for cost e¢ ciency which will a¤ect stability of the
banking sector. It is dened as the operating expenses of a bank as a
share of sum of net-interest revenue and other operating income, the re-
sult variable comes after aggregating the data on the country level. The
data for all four of these variables are taken from the GFDD dataset.
3.1.5 Regulatory and supervision variables
I use regulation and supervision variables to control for the business envi-
ronment in each country. Based on the work of Barth et al. ( 2004, 2005,
2008, 2012) and following many researchers who have used the World
Banks Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) dataset I include the
Entry into Banking Requirements index, the Activity restrictions vari-
able, the Capital regulatory index and the O¢ cial Supervisory Power
index. They are based on a point system and according to whether the
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answer to the question in the survey corresponds to a yesor a nothey
are assigned 1 or 0 points accordingly, they carry the same weight and
then they are added up to result a nal number. More specically:
The Entry into Banking Requirements shows the degree to which dif-
ferent types of legal submissions are required to obtain a banking license
which is inuencing the number of banks that can enter in the banking
sector. This is making it harder or easier for the theoretically not very
stable banks to enter the industry depending on the result of that index.
The variable uses eight questions from the survey to create the index and
it ranges from zero (low entry barrier) to eight (high entry barrier) based
on the aforementioned system.
The Activity restrictions variable shows how much banking activities
such as securities, insurance and real estate are under constraint. It is a
variable that ranges from zero to twelve, with twelve implying the rmest
restrictions system on bank activities. The system that the points as
assigned are that it gets them based on which one of the four possible
answers is given to each question. Namely, Unrestricted=1, Permitted=2,
Restricted=3 and Prohibited=4 and then they are added up to give us
a number which characterises the level or activity restrictions for that
country.
The Capital regulatory index measures the level of regulation on bank
capital that should be set aside as a cushion for potential market and
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credit risks. As it is dened in the BRSS it combines the overall capital
stringency, which captures risk elements which are reected by the capital
requirements and the initial capital stringency, which reects if and to
what extent certain regulatory funds are used or should be used o¢ cially
to initially capitalize a bank. The variable ranges from 0 (no stringency)
to 9 (high stringency), by assigning the values of 0 or 1 to the answers
noor yesaccordingly to nine questions and then adding these values
up.
The O¢ cial supervisory power index quanties the degree of supervi-
sory power exercised by the supervisory authorities and examines whether
they have the authority to intervene in bank managersdecision or even
remove them from their position and replace when necessary. It takes
the values 0 (low power) to 14 (highest power) based on same system as
previously for the selected 14 questions from the survey.
In Table 1 below there is a summary of the statistics of the variables
examined in this chapter. One thing to notice is that all three measures of
competition imply a moderate level of competition. What is interesting
is that the HHIs minimum and maximum values cover almost the entire
range of the index showing that the countries in my sample from very
competitive industries to almost monopolies. The average Boone indica-
tor is also small (-0.039) and negative which is in line with the theoretical
prediction that increase in marginal costs is associated with the loss of
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market share. Another thing to notice is that this sample includes very
poor and very rich countries as shown from the GDP per capita. Fur-
thermore, since the sample period covers the early stages of the recent
nancial crisis, the GDP growth goes as low as -14.8% and because it
includes both advanced and developing countries the maximum that it
reaches is 11.6%. Finally, concerning the regulatory framework in the
countries examined here, the relatively high average values of the reg-
ulatory variables imply relatively high supervisory power and stringent
regulation(since higher values mean more stringent and more restrictive
policies).
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Variable Observations Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Panel A: Key variables
lnZscore 319 2.408 0.767 -0.807 3.845
Boone 318 -0.039 0.369 -2.082 5.968
Lerner 312 0.205 0.134 -1.609 0.470
HHI 320 0.192 0.156 0.012 0.978
Panel B: Country-specific variables
GDP Growth 316 2.195 3.753 -14.814 11.621
Interest rate 311 0.491 2.795 -9.579 25.329
GDP per Capita 320 30576.050 21142.050 2025.316 114119.900
Unemployment 320 7.960 3.712 2.500 21.700
Panel C: Banking sector-specific variables
Cost to Income 319 58.966 18.815 12.729 226.169
Capital /total assets 306 7.008 2.367 2.700 13.800
Net Interest Income 320 2.335 1.414 0.181 8.894
Non Interest Income 316 39.070 12.824 2.272 79.546
Panel D: Regulatory variables
Activity Restrictions 317 6.350 1.767 0.000 11.000
Entry Requirements 317 7.473 1.129 0.000 8.000
Capital regulatory index 317 6.107 1.754 3.000 10.000
Supervisory power 317 10.543 2.515 4.000 14.000
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
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3.2 Model and Methodology
In this section I introduce the baseline model that I am using and I
explain into more detail the chosen explanatory variables using supporting
evidence from the literature.
The model that has been used to examine the relationship between
competition and stability is a dynamic partial equilibrium one; the reason
for the existence of the lagged Zscore is to capture the expected (Garcia-
Marco & Robles-Fernandez (2008), Jimenez et al. (2010) and Ahi and
Laidroo (2016)) persistency in bank risk-taking. If persistency is present,
it is expected to exhibit a positive association with a the dependent vari-
able (Zscore). As discussed in section 3.1.2, several competition measures
are considered in this paper to account for the di¤erent approaches found
in the literature to measure competition. These are included in the model
one by one and their association with z-score is expected to remain am-
biguous.
I control for the business cycle by introducing the GDP real growth
rate has been used by Jimenez et al. (2013) and Olivero et al. (2010).
GDP per capita, is expected to reduce the probability of a bank crisis,
which usually follows loan risk during economic recessions. We also need
to control for di¤erences in economic conditions by adding the unemploy-
ment rate. According to Boyd et al. (2004), when the nominal rate of
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interest (ination) is below a certain threshold, a relatively higher proba-
bility of bank failure is present in monopolies since the motivation to lend
cash reserves dominates that of paying low rates on deposit accounts.
Capital ratio is the value of total equity deated by a banks total
assets. We employ it to account for di¤erentials in risk preference be-
haviour of bank managers along the lines of Schaeck and Cihak (2008)
and Berger et al. (2009). Diversication indicates the ability of a bank
to expand its operations to o¤-balance sheet activities, namely to insur-
ance, real estate and securities activities; thus, a standard proxy is the
total non-interest operating income over total. I expect a negative as-
sociation between diversication and risk but it also might be the case
that banks with high-income diversication are exposed to greater risks
in their attempt to accomplish economies of scope (Stiroh, 2004). Cost
e¢ ciency turns out to be the most widely employed accounting variable
that proxy for cost e¢ ciency as contemporary e¢ ciency modelling may
produce bias due to certain methodological and econometric assumptions.
A negative e¤ect on stability is expected since ine¢ cient banks tend to
engage in risky behaviour to make up for insu¢ cient performance (Uhde
and Heimesho¤, 2009).
Required reserves of capital may constitute su¢ cient bu¤ers in view
of potential liquidity shocks notwithstanding the case of banks embarking
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on gambling behaviour in order to make up either for the utility loss of
powerful bank owners (Laeven and Levine, 2009). O¢ cial supervisory
power is expected to show that strong supervision discourages managers
to undertake excessive risk. This e¤ect can be especially present in coun-
tries with low accounting requirements (Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005).
On the other hand, it may be correlated with corruption in lending trans-
actions, and obstruction of bank operations (Barth et al., 2004). Finally,
activity restrictions are theoretically constructed to stop banks to engag-
ing in more risky activities, thus enhance nancial stability (Uhde and
Heimesho¤, 2009).
The following is the general form of the model that is describing the
relationship between the banking competition and the nancial stability
in a country following the analysis above:
Stability(lnZit) = f [Competition(lnLit; Booneit; HHIit);Country(Cit);
(1)
Banking sector-specic factors(Bit);Regulatory(Rit)] + it
Equation 2 below shows all the variables used to explain the variation
of the nancial stability as expressed by the Zscore:
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ln(Zit) =  + 1ln(Zit 1) + 2ln(Competitionit) + 3GDPGit + 4interestit (2)
+5lngdpcapit + 6unemplit + 7cost_to_incomeit + 8capital_ratioit
+9net_interest_marginit + 10non_interest_incomeit + 11entry_reqit
+12capital_regit + 13super_powerit + 13activity_restrit + eit
Where ln(Z) is the natural logarithm of the Z-score for the bank-
ing sector of country i at time t; ln (Competition) is either the natural
logarithm of the Lerner Index, the Boone index or the HHI index for
country i at time t; GDPG is the growth rate of real GDP; interest is
the real short-term interest-rates for country i at time t; lngdpercapita is
the natural logarithm of the real GDP per capita for country i at time t;
unempl is the unemployment rate in country i at time t; cost_to_income
is the ratio of costs to total income for banking-sector of country i at
time t; ; capital_ratio is the ratio of a countrys banking sector eq-
uity divided by the banking sectors total assets for country i at time
t; net_interest_margin is the banking sectors net interest revenue as a
share of its average interest-bearing total assets in country i at time t;
non_interest_income is the noninterest income for the banking sector of
country i at time t, divided by the total income of the countrys bank-
ing sector; entry_req stands for entry into banking requirements for the
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banks of country i at time t; capital_reg stands for the capital regula-
tory index of the country i at time t; super_power stands for the o¢ cial
supervisory power index for the country i at time t; activity_restr is the
activity restrictions index for the country i at time t.
3.3 Estimation technique
In order to nd out what estimation technique to use for my sample and
models I rst need to check if the lagged dependent variable is signicant.
From the results in Table 3 and 4 it appears to be highly signicant in all
the specications which means that I should be using a dynamic model.
This, combined with the fact that I have only 10 periods in my sample
and an unbalanced panel, limits the available options.
According to Nickell (1981) the existence of both lagged dependent
variables and xed e¤ects causes a well-known bias. However, Judson and
Owen (1999) show that it is better to use standard xed e¤ects estimation
rather than GMM in unbalanced panels when T is large (T>30), the
bias declines as the number of time periods increases, and the results
of the estimation will be consistent (given there is no autocorrelation
of the error terms). Kiviet (1995) argues that the best way to handle
dynamic panel bias is to perform LSDV (Least Square Dummy Variable),
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then correct the results for the bias, which he nds can be predicted
with great precision. However, the approach he advances works only for
balanced panels and does not address the potential endogeneity of other
regressors. My unbalanced dataset and potential endogeneity from my
regressors(Lerner) means that I cannot use the bias correction models
available as it violates their assumptions.
I am using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to
estimate my models which is developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and
then improved by Blundell and Bond (1998). This GMM estimator in-
struments the di¤erenced variables that are not strictly exogenous with
all their available lags in levels and variables in levels are instrumented
with lags of their own rst di¤erences. Under this approach, exogenous
variables(regulatory variables), transformed in rst di¤erences, are in-
strumented by themselves, while endogenous regressors (including lagged
Zscore and Lerner) are transformed in rst di¤erences and instrumented
by their lags in levels and all the other control variables are considered
predetermined. It ensures e¢ ciency and consistency provided that the
models are not subject to serial correlation of order two (Louzis et al.
(2012)) and that the instruments used are valid which are tested using
the AR(2) and the Sargan/Hansen testing for the validity of instrument
subsets, which in all of my regressions is not present.
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Finally, according to Arellano and Bond (1991) andWindmeijer (2005)
the two-step estimated standard errors have a small-sample downward
bias in dynamic panel data setting. Following Roodman (2007), I avoid
this by using the Windmeijer (2005) error terms. I restrict the number of
lags to two to limit the number of instruments used.
4 Empirical results
In this section I examine the e¤ect that the competition on the bank-
ing industry has on that countrys nancial stability. At this point it is
important to remember that the three di¤erent measures of competition
examine di¤erent aspects of the competition. More specically the Boone
indicator connects e¢ ciency with competition, the Lerner measures mar-
ket power and HHI measures the level of concentration in the industry.
It might be the case that severe competition can lead to mergers and
acquisitions, which in turn leads to highly concentrated markets.
To see the relationship among the three alternative competition mea-
sures used in this sample, in Table 2 we nd the Pearson correlations
matrix of the variables of main interest used in this analysis (i.e. compe-
tition and regulatory variables). What is important to observe is that even
though the correlations among the three measures are signicant, they are
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low which shows exactly that they are measuring competition in a di¤er-
ent way. Also, the Boone indicator is low and negative but statistically
signicantly correlated with the other competition indicators (i.e. Lerner,
HHI) which is something that has also been discussed in De Jonghe et.al.
(2016). In addition, the Lerner and HHI are negatively correlated with
each other and the coe¢ cient is signicant which says that the banks in
more concentrated countries do not necessarily have more market power.
Finally, I included the regulatory variables to see if there is a correlation
between competitive markets and regulation. The positive correlation
(negative correlation) of the Lerner index (Boone indicator) with the Re-
strictions, Entry_requirements and Supervisory_power means that less
competitive countries have more stringent regulations.
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Variable Lerner Boone HHI Restrictions EntryRequirements
-0.1646
(0.0037)
-0.1537 0.1427
(0.0065) (0.0583)
0.0839 -0.0285 0.0373
(0.0411) (0.0642) (0.5082)
0.0852 -0.0378 -0.0139 0.0087
(0.0353) (0.0544) (0.8055) (0.8776)
0.0799 -0.0953 0.0093 0.1601 0.0742
(0.0612) (0.0914) (0.8697) (0.0043) (0.1875)
Table 2: Correlation matrix
1
1
1
1
Boone
HHI
Restrictions
Entry
Requirements
Supervisory
power
4.1 Competition and stability results
In Table 3, I show the results for my baseline models. The three di¤erent
groups of control variables are introduced in three steps. In columns
(1) and (2) in the model the country level variables are used as controls
variables to focus on the e¤ect of the competition measures on stability.
The model used is:
Stability(lnZit) = f [Competition(lnLit; Booneit; );Country(Cit); ] + eit
(3)
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In columns (3) and (4) the regulatory variables are introduced to ex-
amine their impact on the key variables of this study(i.e. competition).
The model used is:
Stability(lnZit) = f [Competition(lnLit; Booneit; );Country(Cit); (4)
Regulatory(Rit)] + eit
The last specication includes all four types of variables as described
in the model below:
Stability(lnZit) = f [Competition(lnLit; Booneit; );Country(Cit); (5)
Regulatory(Rit);Banking sector-specic factors(Bit)]
+ eit
In all three specications the lagged dependent variable is highly sig-
nicant and positive, which shows that previous periods stability is pos-
itively inuencing the current periods stability. When I use the Lerner
index I nd that it is positively related to the Zscore suggesting that as
the market power of the banks in the industry is increasing so does the -
nancial stability. In other words competition increases bank risk which is
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in favour of the "competition-fragility" approach. This prediction is line
with idea that, over time, increased competition causes banks to "reach
for yield" in an e¤ort to stay protable (e.g., Becker and Ivashina, 2013).
Anginer et al.(2014), however, attribute this co-movement, partly on the
fact that both the Zscore and the Lerner index are calculated using bank
balance sheet protability measures.
On the other hand the Boone indicator is negatively impacting the
Zscore which means that a higher value of the Boone (less negative values
mean lower competition) will decrease the stability of the nancial sys-
tem. This result is in favour of the "competition-stability" nexus. This
is the opposite result from the Lerner index, however inconsistencies in
results obtained with di¤erent competition indicators are not uncommon
even within the same sample (e.g. Liu et al., 2012, Kick and Prieto, 2015)
since, as explained earlier, the di¤erent measures explain di¤erent aspects
of the competition. The Boone indicator examines it from the e¢ ciency
prospective. Since it is based on the idea that the more e¢ cient banks
will have higher prots in a competitive environment, the higher the com-
petition the more e¢ cient the banks will become in order to continue to
exist, leading to a more stable nancial system.
From the banking sector-specic variables Non_Interest_Income and
Capital ratio are signicant and positive. For the former, the banks by
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increasing their income that is not coming from interest earnings (e.g.
charges to exchange money) they can limit the activities which are asso-
ciated with potential risk from the interest earning assets which is con-
tribution to the reduction of their overall risk. On the other hand, Brun-
nermeier et al. (2011) nd that non-interest income is pro-cyclical and
is associated with higher systemic risk. For the Capital_ratio the jus-
tication is that since better capitalised banks are able to absorb larger
loan losses and negative shocks which contributes to the stability of the
nancial system. As far as the country control variables are concerned,
the GDP growth (GDPG) and GDPperCapita have a positive sign(not
always signicant) in all specications as expected. Finally the inter-
est_rate is negative and signicant (in all specications apart from the
rst one) which is showing that high interest rates increase the cost of
borrowing which can force the rms to take on riskier projects in order to
gain a higher return and compensate for the higher interest rate. It can
also be the case that higher interest rates attract "bad borrowers" who
are willing to pay the higher premium to get a loan, thus increasing the
riskiness of the banks portfolio.
The consistency of the system GMM estimator depends both on the
assumptions that the error term is not auto-correlated as well as on the
number and validity of the instruments used. In Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6
three important types of tests are shown. The rst test (AR(1) and
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AR(2)) examines the hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the error term.
The presence of rst-order autocorrelation (rejecting the null hypothesis
for the AR(1)) in the rst di¤erence does not imply that the estimates
are inconsistent. However, the presence of second-order autocorrelation
(rejecting the null hypothesis for the AR(2)) implies that the estimates
are inconsistent. The second one is the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions. Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the results are
weakened by the use of many instruments. The third one is a Hansen
test, which examines the validity of the instruments. Rejecting the null
hypothesis means that the instruments used are not robust.
In all these tables (3, 4, 5 & 6) the AR(1) test and the Sargan test are
rejected and the AR(2) test and Hansen test cannot be rejected at 10%
signicance level and in most cases at 1% and 5% signicance level. These
results from the tests do not indicate a reason to question the validity of
the instruments used or the consistency of the estimates.
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Table 3: Results of the baseline model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Lerner
Equation 3
Boone
Equation 3
Lerner
Equation 4
Boone
Equation 4
Lerner
Equation 5
Boone
Equation 5
Lag lnZscore 0.726*** 0.484*** 0.799*** 0.576*** 0.750*** 0.606***
(0.149) (0.0834) (0.0371) (0.924) (0.118) (0.0691)
Competition measure 1.693** -0.335*** 0.399*** -0.356*** 0.361* -0.438***
(0.807) (0.0356) (0.0511) (0.0791) (0.213) (0.0881)
GDPG 0.0198* 0.0156* 0.00800 0.012 0.00242 -0.00701
(0.0111) (0.00990) (0.00520) (0.01) (0.00843) (0.00977)
Interest_rate -0.0265 -0.0317*** -0.0226*** -0.028** -0.0188** -0.0389***
(0.0198) (0.0111) (0.00487) (0.011) (0.00701) (0.00919)
lnGDPperCapita 0.213* 0.161 0.139** 0.129 0.380** 0.331**
(0.124) (0.151) (0.0654) (0.116) (0.186) (0.137)
Restrictions -0.0132 -0.00327 0.0249 -0.0165
(0.0147) (0.0218) (0.0539) (0.0294)
Entry_Requirements -0.0464** -0.017 0.00686 0.0305
(0.0178) (0.046) (0.0445) (0.0842)
Supervisory_Power 0.0194** 0.022 0.0510* 0.0463**
(0.00842) (0.021) (0.0276) (0.0210)
NetInterestMargin 0.132 0.152
(0.0872) (0.111)
Non_Interest_Income 0.0129*** 0.0100*
(0.00361) (0.00499)
Capital ratio 0.0709* 0.0338
(0.0397) (0.0491)
Constant -1.119 -0.416 -0.794 -0.65 -5.392*** -3.983**
(1.165) (1.632) (0.676) (1.328) (1.937) (1.735)
Observations 270 275 267 272 253 258
Number of countries 32 32 32 32 32 32
No of instruments 14 14 19 19 26 26
AR(1)p-value 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005
AR(2)p-value 0.860 0.482 0.792 0.770 0.124 0.874
Sargan test (Pr>chi2) 0.012 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen test (Pr>chi2) 0.186 0.154 0.255 0.298 0.603 0.100
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The system GMM regression estimates with Windmeijer-
corrected standard errors are reported of the effect of competition on stability. The dependant variable is the natural
logarithm of the Zscore. The Lerner index is used as the Competition measure in columns (1), (3) & (5) and the Boone indicator
in columns (2), (4) & (6). Columns (1) & (2) only include the banking sector specific variables specified in Equation 3. Columns
(3) & (4) include the banking sector specific variables and the Country specific variables specified in Equation 4. Columns (5)
& (6) include the banking sector specific variables, the country specific variables and the regulatory variables specified in
Equation 5. The p-value of the Hansen test of validity, the p-value of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the
p-value of the first-order autocorrelation test (AR(1) and AR(2)) are reported. The p-value of the F stat of the equation is
shown in the last row.
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4.2 Impact of regulation
In Table 4 below, motivated by the work of Anginer et al. (2012), I
examine the impact that the regulation has on the relationship between
competition and stability which was found in the analysis above. In or-
der to do that, I use the same model as in columns 3 and 4 in Table 3
augmented by interaction terms between the competition measures and
the regulation variables. This can be seen below:
Stability(lnZit) = f [Competition(lnLit; Booneit; );Country(Cit); (6)
Regulatory(Rit);Banking sector-specic factors(Bit)]
Interaction regulatory terms(Iit)+ it
where the Interaction_regulatory _terms (Iit) are the competition
variable multiplied by the regulatory variable. In each column only one
regulatory variable is introduced along with its interaction term. In
columns (1)-(3) the Lerner index is used and for columns (4)-(6) the
Boone indicator. The control variables are omitted from the table to
allow the key variables to be examined more clearly. From the results
we see that the supervisory power interaction term is signicant for both
competition measures. Specically, in the case of the Boone estimator the
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coe¢ cient of the interaction term is positive which means that the gain
in stability from higher supervisory power is greater in less competitive
markets. Similarly, the benet from more stringent activity restrictions
is lower for less competitive banking systems. Also, the coe¢ cients of
both competition measures change sign in the presence of the signicant
restrictions interaction term. These results imply that when the poli-
cymakers fail to achieve their goal of competition they can compensate
by monitoring,intervening better and having more power to impose their
authority.
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Table 4: Impact of regulatory environment on the competition-stability nexus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Lerner
Restrictions
Lerner
Entry
Lerner
Power
Boone
Restrictions
Boone
Entry
Boone
Power
L.lnZscore 0.541*** 0.622*** 0.565*** 0.238 0.423*** 0.591***
(0.115) (0.199) (0.114) (0.197) (0.196) (0.078)
Competition measure -4.666* -1.644 -0.171 1.509** -3.43* -1.268***
(2.621) (2.683) (0.124) (0.552) (1.82) (0.353)
Restrictions -0.164* -0.082
(0.085) (0.0805)
Lerner x Restrictions 0.865*
(0.437)
Entry_Requirements -0.132 0.196
(0.118) (0.178)
Lerner x Entry_Requirements 0.353
(0.436)
Supervisory_Power -0.0032 0.040
(0.063) (0.033)
Lerner x Supervisory_Power -0.134*
(0.13)
Boone x Restrictions -2.556***
(0.916)
Boone x Requirements 0.495
(0.296)
Boone x Supervisory_power 0.145**
(0.054)
Constant 1.962*** 1.675 0.799** 3.403*** 0.3 0.599**
(0.499) (1.117) (0.363) (0.176) (1.39) (0.283)
Observations 278 278 278 283 283 283
No of countries 32 32 32 32 32 32
No of instruments 19 19 19 19 19 19
AR(1)p-value 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.045 0.000 0.001
AR(2)p-value 0.319 0.630 0.600 0.332 0.306 0.206
Sargan test(Pr>chi2) 0.039 0.085 0.74 0.000 0.000 0.046
Hansen test(Pr>chi2) 0.495 0.548 0.453 0.110 0.101 0.651
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The system GMM regression estimates with Windmeijer-
corrected standard errors are reported of the effect of regulation on the competition-stability nexus. The dependant variable
is the natural logarithm of the Zscore. In all columns the specification of Equation 6 is followed. The Lerner index is used as
the Competition measure in columns (1)-(3) and the Boone indicator in columns (4)-(6). Activity Restrictions are used in
columns (1) & (4); Entry Requirements are used in columns (2) & (5); Supervisory Power are used in columns (3) & (6). The
control variables are omitted from the table to allow the key variables to be examined more clearly). The p-value of the
Hansen test of validity, the p-value of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the p-value of the first-order
autocorrelation test (AR(1) and AR(2)) are reported. The p-value of the F stat of the equation is shown in the last row.
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4.3 Robustness checks
In Table 5 below, the HHI is used as an alternative measure of risk to
shed more light in the relationship between competition and stability as
the competition measure using in Table 3 (Lerner, Boone) are incon-
clusive. On thing to notice is that in the literature concentration mea-
sures are considered as poor proxies for bank competition (Claessens and
Laeven(2004)). In columns (4), (5) and (6) in Table 5, a nal robustness
test is conducted to examine whether the specication of the model used
in Equation 2 is correct, which is done by including the squared version of
the various competition measures in the full model in columns (5) and (6)
in Table 3. This is testing for non-linearity in the relationship between
the competition and stability which would show that for certain levels of
competition it is a positive and for the rest it will be negative. None of the
squared terms appears to be signicant, even though what is interesting
is that when introduced to the Boone model they change its coe¢ cient to
positive which is line with the "competition-fragility" theory, however it
is insignicant.
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Table 5: Robustness checks using HHI and the non-linearity approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES HHI
Equation 3
HHI
Equation 4
HHI
Equation 5
Lerner
Nonlinearity
Boone
Nonlinearity
HHI
Nonlinearity
L.lnZscore 0.618*** 0.693*** 0.584*** 0.768*** 0.526*** 0.400*
(0.0951) (0.100) (0.0816) (0.150) (0.139) (0.234)
Competition measure -1.510** -0.643* -0.639* 0.883** 0.149 3.970
(0.721) (0.321) (0.340) (0.331) (0.628) (2.775)
Competition measure_sq 0.417 0.318 -3.625
(0.308) (0.357) (3.020)
GDPG 0.0365 0.008 0.006 -0.001 0.007 0.00399
(0.0241) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.01) (0.00903)
Interest_rate 0.0288 -0.023** -0.028*** -0.0204*** -0.0224*** -0.0152*
(0.0325) (0.010) (0.01) (0.007) (0.00697) (0.00766)
lnGDPperCapita 0.432** 0.199* 0.535*** 0.220 0.383** 0.777***
(0.184) (0.107) (0.184) (0.190) (0.178) (0.274)
Restrictions -0.016 -0.023 0.0105 0.0362 0.0691
(0.020) (0.024) (0.036) (0.0869) (0.0717)
Entry_Requirements -0.06* -0.010 0.011 0.0805 0.104
(0.032) (0.088) (0.057) (0.0859) (0.0688)
Supervisory_Power 0.018 0.055 0.043 0.0494 0.0777*
(0.022) (0.037) (0.027) (0.0317) (0.0402)
NetInterestMargin 0.265** 0.073 0.142 0.186
(0.107) (0.104) (0.105) (0.120)
Non_Interest_Income 0.010* 0.011** 0.0139** 0.0133**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.00522) (0.00637)
Capital ratio 0.042 0.040 0.0694 0.0824
(0.047) (0.053) (0.0664) (0.0604)
Constant -3.829* -1.693 -6.117** -3.360 -5.470** -10.49***
(1.904) (1.421) (2.685) (2.591) (2.375) (3.563)
Observations 276 273 259 253 258 259
Number of countries 32 32 32 32 32 32
No of instruments 14 19 26 26 26 26
AR(1)p-value 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.024
AR(2)p-value 0.748 0.985 0.147 0.579 0.218
Sargan test (Pr>chi2) 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen test (Pr>chi2) 0.285 0.252 0.611 0.541 0.588
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The system GMM regression estimates with Windmeijer-
corrected standard errors are reported of the effect of concentration on stability. The dependant variable is the natural
logarithm of the Zscore. The HHI index is used as the Competition measure in columns (1)-(3). Column (1) only includes the
banking sector specific variables specified in Equation 3. Column (2) includes the banking sector specific variables and the
Country specific variables specified in Equation 4. Column (3) includes the banking sector specific variables, the country
specific variables and the regulatory variables specified in Equation 5. The squared competition variable is introduced in in
columns (4)-(6) to test the non-linearity condition using the specification found in the model (5). The Lerner index is used as
the Competition measure in column (4), the Boone indicator in column (5) and the HHI index in column (6). The p-value of the
Hansen test of validity, the p-value of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the p-value of the first-order
autocorrelation test (AR(1) and AR(2)) are reported. The p-value of the F stat of the equation is shown in the last row.
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5 Conclusion
A mistake that is very common in the literature (especially in the early
studies) is that all the measures of concentration and competition that
have been used are interpreted as competition. In truth, competition is
not observable and it is very di¢ cult to measure. Thus, so far, there
have only being proxies, with sometimes underlying assumptions which
are di¢ cult to be satised in most cases, that are focusing on di¤erent
parts of the competition (e.g. price, quantity, quality). This means that
we, especially the policymakers, need to be careful how we interpret the
results found in studies in this literature.
One of the policymakers and supervisorstasks is to monitor (and in-
tervene when necessary) the level of competition in the banking market
in order to assist nancial stability. In this chapter, I attempted to shed
some light on the important subject of competition and stability while
examining the contribution of the regulatory framework. I use aggre-
gated data at the country level for the western advanced economies (EU,
Switzerland, Norway, USA, Canada). I nd that higher market power
and concentration lead to higher stability which implies that the benet
of supervising and regulating less banks is higher than the cost of having
more systemically important banks ("too big to fail").
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On the other hand, my third measure of competition (Boone), which
shows that more e¤ective banks get a higher market share in a compet-
itive environment, o¤ers evidence for the "competition-stability" theory.
This means that the negative impact of the competition, which is small
prot margins pushing the banks to riskier activities to increase their
earning, is outweighed by the ability of more e¢ cient banks to better
diversify. Furthermore, I nd evidence of an increase in the benecial ef-
fects of higher supervisory power and more stringent activity restrictions
on nancial stability in the less competitive markets. Finally, the results
do not support the idea expressed in late studies that, in some countries,
the relationship between competition and stability is not linear.
These results are useful for policymakers who need to make decisions
and ensure stability in a number of countries simultaneously like for the
European Central Bank or the Basel Committee. They will primarily be
interested in how the representative bank reacts to changes in regulation
and competition to help them achieve on average their targets (stability
and growth). However, the results derived using aggregated data for some
of the variables by give misleading results for the policymakers of indi-
viduals countries. For example, the Lerner Index which is showing the
market power of the bank, when aggregated might produce a relatively
small value which would suggest a high level of competition in the indus-
try. It might be the case, though, that very few banks in that country
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have very high market power while each one of all the others one are much
less powerful even if they are not much smaller banks.
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Appendix
Table 6 presents the results from the estimation of regressing the com-
plete model for the various competition measures. The dependent vari-
able in these models remains lnZscore and additional control variables are
added which are explained in the model and methodology section under
Equation 2. In this version of the model, it still shows that it should exam-
ined as a dynamic specication as the lagged Zscore is highly signicant
and robust in all cases. Also, the competition measures remain signicant
with the same signs (positive Lerner and HHI and negative Boone). Fi-
nally, the interest_rate, the Non_Interest Income and the Capital ratio
remain signicant and have the expected signs. However, because of the
number of regressors and instruments has increased so much for my sam-
ple, there is a decrease in the p-value of the Hansen test and many of the
variables are becoming insignicant since it is losing degrees of freedom
from the addition of the, previously omitted, insignicant regressors.
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Table 6: Equation 2 specification
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Lerner
Equation 2
Boone
Equation 2
HHI
Equation 2
L.lnZscore 0.608*** 0.456*** 0.533***
(0.193) (0.104) (0.081)
Competition measure 0.501*** -0.342*** 0.0439*
(0.139) (0.103) (0.04)
GDPG 0.00117 0.00031 0.0113
(0.011) (0.0106) (0.011)
interest_rate -0.0211** -0.0341*** -0.0182**
(0.0102) (0.0083) (0.0075)
lnCapita 0.379 0.258 0.376*
(0.246) (0.266) (0.197)
Restrictions -0.024 0.0064 -0.0235
(0.0421) (0.0545) (0.0265)
Entry_Requirements -0.0458 0.0076 -0.0031
(0.0592) (0.0401) (0.0441)
Supervisory_Power -0.018 -0.0004 -0.0166
(0.033) (0.0265) (0.0259)
Net Interest Margin 0.159 0.0980 0.134
(0.141) (0.152) (0.103)
Non_Income 0.0115*** 0.0106** 0.0104*
(0.0033) (0.0049) (0.0057)
Capital ratio 0.127* 0.0635 0.115*
(0.0653) (0.0834) (0.066)
Unemployment 0.0008 -0.0064 -0.0129
(0.0210) (0.0271) (0.015)
Capital_regulatory 0.0047 0.009 0.0224
(0.025) (0.033) (0.0195)
Constant -4.028 -2.525 -3.878
(2.862) (3.136) (2.401)
Observations 253 258 259
No of countries 32 32 32
No of instruments 30 30 30
AR(1) p-value 0.013 0.004 0.005
AR(2) p-value 0.482 0.848 0.755
Sargan (pr>chi2) 0.001 0.077 0.002
Hansen(pr>chi2) 0.169 0.126 0.263
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The system GMM regression estimates
with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported of the effect of competition on stability using
the specification in Equation 2. The dependant variable is the natural logarithm of the Zscore. The Lerner
index is used in column (1), the Boone indicator in column (2) and the HHI index in column (3) as the
Competition measure. The p-value of the Hansen test of validity, the p-value of the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions and the p-value of the first-order autocorrelation test (AR(1) and AR(2)) are
reported. The p-value of the F stat of the equation is shown in the last row.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
The capital requirements have been used the last decades as one of
the main instruments for supervision and intervention in the banking
industry. The recent nancial crisis has highlighted that this policy has
not been adequate and that it allowed enough room for the banks to
exploit it and maximise their prots without considering the consequences
and without been held accountable for their choices. On the contrary
they were bailed out when necessary and were granted large amounts on
money to assist them with their recapitalisation. This unravelled the lack
of supervision and appropriate regulatory framework to deal with "too big
to fail" banks, the ine¤ective measure of risk weighted assets (RWA) and
the level of interdependence in the nancial sectors across the countries.
Also, the high quality capital held by the banks was insu¢ cient to absorb
negative shocks and externalities from other nancial institutions. The
results found in this thesis will need to be re-examined after the complete
implementation of the Basel III framework as it can bring a structural
change in bank behaviour.
This thesis has attempted to answer questions about the e¤ect of
current regulation and competition policies on the banks behaviour, eco-
nomic growth and nancial stability. In Chapter 2, I built a theoretical
framework to investigate how a representative bank adjusts its risk and
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capital management strategy in response to changes in minimum capital
requirements. I identify two main indirect e¤ects coming from the change
in regulation on the banks behaviour. The rst one is the protability
e¤ect coming from the more protable return of the risky asset com-
pared to the capital (safer asset), and the insurance e¤ect coming from
the banks need to secure against risk. For su¢ ciently low levels of risk,
the protability e¤ect dominates and the bank views capital and risk as
utility substitutes. In the case of su¢ ciently large levels of risk the in-
surance e¤ect dominates and the bank views them as complements. The
evidence from the quantitative analysis shows that for the UK banks the
latter case holds implying a co-movement of risk and capital. This raises
issues about the overall stability of the bank after an increase in capital
requirements and the policymakers should consider the optimal risk and
capital response linessensitivity to this change before implementing any
policy.
Furthermore, since the results depend on parameters (which might
depend on the state of the economy), the result that I nd of potential
backre which should be considered as a recommendation to the policy-
makers to be cautious rather than anything stronger. A general equilib-
rium model, for example, could result in a rigid set of instructions to the
policymakers. What can be said, however is that the parameters (volatil-
ity and expected value of return and the absolute risk aversion coe¢ cient)
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used in this model can be of interest for the policymakers as they seem to
a¤ect the banks risk behaviour. Intuitively, an explanation as to why the
parameters used for the UK banks bring the potential backre is that,
in such concentrated market, banks might believe they are "too big to
fail" and when they increase their capital they also increase their level of
risk as they are expecting a bailout safety net. Taken that into account,
the policymakers by increased the capital requirements and removing the
implied promise of the safety net might change the way the banks risk
taking behaviour. This regime is implicit in this model as it does not
include bailouts. This static partial equilibrium model o¤ers some signif-
icant insights into the banks risk behaviour without the complexity of a
dynamic model. Having said that, the latter could be more informative,
after analysing the game between the bank and the regulator, about the
actions the regulator should take given the banks responses.
In Chapter 3 I investigate the impact of capital surplus/decit on
the banks loan portfolio and asset management for the case of the UK
commercial banks. Following an increase in capital requirements, I nd
evidence of an increase in loans that have less weight according to the risk
weighted assets approach along with an increase in capital and a decrease
in the ones which carry more weight. However, I explain that there are
other risks involved(not captured by the RWA) with mortgage loans (espe-
cially for commercial buildings) during an economic crisis because of their
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diminishing value of the collateral. This shows the level of ine¢ ciency of
the risk weighted assets in its current state. Also, I nd a negative rela-
tionship between capital and economic growth raising the question about
the procyclicality e¤ects of capital requirements. The Basel Committee
seems to be aware of these issues as in Basel III higher countercyclical
capital ratio, along with changes in the risk weighting system will be in-
troduced shortly in the banking industry. There is also the problem of the
tendency of the UK banks to rst raise lower quality capital to meet in-
creased capital requirements rather than the higher quality Tier 1 capital
which is better at absorbing loan losses and negative externalities.
The policy implications from Chapter 3 can be extended when consid-
ering the pre/post crisis analysis. The banks appear to focus on adjusting
their portfolio more intensively during the period of the nancial crisis
than they did before it because it is expensive to raise capital quickly
during the nancial crisis. Policy makers need to be aware of the con-
tradiction of imposing higher capital requirements along with exhorting
the banks to lend to businesses and aid the recovery. Another point to be
made is that this study by focusing on the composition of the loan portfo-
lio and not on the total loans shows that a change in capital requirements
a¤ects the di¤erent types of loans di¤erently. Knowing that banks adjust
their loan portfolio following the risk weights instructions for calculating
the RWA, the policymakers can change the risk weights to target the part
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of the economy that they want to support at that point in time. A nan-
cial crisis is a special case and innovative solutions should be applied. For
future research, it can be considered the case that the e¤ects examined
here will a¤ect the business cycle, since the banks examined here as large
banks, which could then feedback into the model. This could be done by
using a macro model which would take the e¤ect of Gap on loans, to the
macro economy, which in turn would change the GDP growth.
In Chapter 4 I examine the competition-stability nexus in advanced
Western economies using aggregated data on the country level to focus on
the overall risk of the industry. I use three di¤erent proxies for competi-
tion and I nd evidence to support both the competition-stability and the
competition-fragility theory depending on which proxy I use. Higher mar-
ket power (Lerner index) and concentration (HHI index) increase overall
stability supporting the theory of fewer banks becoming easier for the
policymakers to supervise and regulate. On the other hand, more com-
petition (Boone estimator) will make the banks more e¢ cient and better
diversied in order to survive, promoting stability. The three measures of
competition have small correlation among them justifying the idea that
di¤erent competition proxies capture di¤erent aspects of the competition
and correlate di¤erently with the stability measures even in the same
sample (Liu et al. (2012), Kick and Prieto (2015)). Also the analysis
yields a higher benet in stability from higher supervisory power and
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more stringent activity restrictions in less competitive markets.
It is clear from the literature that the answer to the question if more
or less competition is better for stability is very case dependent. The issue
of proxing competition accurately still remains, so the regulators should
use various competition and stability proxies to get robust results for
the nancial sector that they are regulating which can be di¤erent from
country to country. One thing for the policymakers to consider is that a
market might be highly concentrated but very competitive without any
entry barriers. That case is when the banks operate with very low prot
margins which can act as a strong deterrent to any other banks which
want to enter. This is the case of the UK, since there are no regulations
against entry however banking is a highly concentrated market because
the competition level is high. The study examined in Chapter 4 uses a
reduced form partial equilibrium model, however for the case of the UK
(since this chapter and the literature suggest that the results are case
dependent) it could be expanded into a wider macro model with threat
of entry.
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